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NANCY S. KIM*
Clicking and Cringing
Shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap licenses have
complicated contract law by introducing nontraditional methods
of contracting to govern the use of software. The retention of the
underlying intellectual property by the licensor, and the malleable
qualities of software, give rise to the ability and the need to set
parameters of use. The courts have tended to defer to the
ownership rights of licensors by claiming that there is valid
contract formation, even in "rolling contract" situations. In this
Article, I propose that a consumer's assent to a transaction should
not be transmuted into blanket assent to each individual term of a
nonnegotiated contract. Instead, the concept of "assent" should
be bifurcated into two parts, actual assent and presumed assent.
Actual assent means manifested, express agreement. Presumed
assent means that the licensee, by expressly agreeing to the
transaction, may also be presumed to have assented to certain
terms of the contract. The licensee should not be presumed to
have assented to all "not unreasonable" contract terms, however,
as is currently the case under the "blanket assent" approach to
contracts. Whether the licensee's assent to a given term may be
presumed depends upon the operative effect of the term. The
licensee may be presumed to have assented to provisions
governing the "scope of license" or the "terms of use" (as further
defined) to the software or web site because such terms establish
the conditions upon which the licensor has agreed to make the
digital information available. Furthermore, the caption heading
of "scope of license" or "terms of use" should not be
determinative. The licensee should not be presumed to have
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assented to provisions that (i) impose affirmative obligations or
(ii) purport to take away the licensee's legal rights. The
Introduction sets forth the doctrinal problems related to
nonnegotiated software licenses. Part I proposes a two-step
analysis. The first step is to determine whether the putative
licensee has assented and the nature of that assent (i.e. whether the
assent is to engage in the transaction or whether the assent is to a
particular term). The second step is to determine what terms
govern the activity based upon the nature of the assent. Part H
summarizes and analyzes the current case law using my proposed
approach, and applies the approach to a sample license
agreement. The Conclusion explains that a presumption of assent
to scope of license terms and a requirement of actual assent to
other material terms both respects the integrity of contract
doctrine and accommodates business realities.
INTRODUCTION
T his Article seeks to expand the current discussion
governing software licenses and argues that the sui generis
nature of software often necessitates deviations from the
classical contract model of bargaining. A software license
enables the licensee to use but not own the software. The
intangible and malleable qualities of software, and the retention
of the underlying intellectual property rights by the licensor, give
rise to the ability and the need to set parameters of use.' This
does not mean that when it comes to software licenses, the
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law and Visiting Associate
Professor, Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego. The
author gratefully acknowledges the many helpful comments received when an
earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference of Asian Pacific
American Law Professors, William Mitchell School of Law, April 27-28, 2007, the
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the faculty development workshops at California Western School of Law and the J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Special thanks to Tom
Barton, Seth Burns, Richard Craswell, Mike Dessent, Paul Goldstein, Jim Gordon,
Cynthia Ho, Tom Joo, Mark Lemley, Cheryl Preston, Judith Resnik, Alan
Schwartz, and Bob Scott for their insights and suggestions. Thanks to Helene Colin
for her thorough research assistance and to Megan Miskill, Kirk Nestse, and Megan
Thompson of the Oregon Law Review for their diligent editing work.
I See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and
Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 484-
86 (1995) (describing the public goods problem as "particularly acute" in the case of
software which is easily copied and distributable).
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licensor's exercise of ownership should be unchecked or that the
licensee's rights should be unduly restricted. It does, however,
mean that contract and commercial law doctrines may conflict
with and offend notions of fair play in business transactions.
This Article proposes an analytical approach that respects the
integrity of contract doctrine while taking into consideration the
business realities involved in licensing software.
Legal commentary of software licenses tends to be limited to
discussion of nonnegotiated agreements, such as shrinkwraps,
browsewraps, and clickwraps,2 and often lumps these three types
of licenses together.3 In fact, software is licensed in a variety of
ways. In many cases, the licensee enters into the license"agreement" simply by opening the package containing the
software. In many other cases, however, the licensee has spent
months negotiating the terms of the license agreement. A
software license encompasses both extremes as well as variations
in between. The focus of this Article, however, is solely on the
problem of assent with respect to nonnegotiated shrinkwrap,
browsewrap, and clickwrap licenses.
A shrinkwrap license refers to an agreement that is wrapped
in plastic and included with a disc containing a software5
program. The licensee manifests assent to the terms of the
shrinkwrap agreement either by tearing open the plastic wrap
containing the software, or by installing the software. A
clickwrap agreement is electronically transmitted and requires
clicking on a button indicating assent prior to downloading
software or accessing a web site.7  A browsewrap license
purports to bind an individual accessing a web site but does not
require the user to expressly manifest assent.8
2 See generally id.
3 While the interplay of contract and property concepts arises in all software
licensing transactions, I limit myself in this Article to discussion of nonnegotiated
licenses only.
4 I reserve for another day the other relevant contract formation issues of
offer/acceptance and consideration.
5 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239, 1241 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property].
6 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
7 Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459 (2006) [hereinafter
Lemley, Terms of Use].
8 Id.; see also Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of
Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 Bus. LAW. 279 (2003)
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Cases, scholarship, and professional organization reports
evaluating nonnegotiated software licenses have tended to focus
on the issue of contract formation, and specifically, on the matter
of assent.9 In many cases, the consumer or putative licensee
does not actually read the software license terms but the courts
have nonetheless found the requisite "assent" necessary for
contract formation. In so doing, the courts are deferring to the
licensor's business interests and the policy of facilitating business
transactions rather than reaching an inevitable conclusion of
assent mandated by contract law.
In this Article, I argue that resorting to presumed assent is
often necessary, and desirable, to address the unique business
needs associated with licensing software. Currently, courts
purport to find assent where none exists in an attempt to enforce
contracts that provide a net benefit to society.10 Yet, while a
finding of constructive assent sometimes may be necessary to
enforce socially desirable contracts, certain parameters should
be set around such a legal fiction. A failure to do so imposes in
toto contract law principles that were established with consenting
parties as a premise upon a transaction that occurred without
[hereinafter Kunz, Browse-Wrap Agreements]. While browsewrap agreements
often do not involve downloading software, they do purport to govern a licensee's
access and use of a licensor's web site. Because a web site owner has a proprietary
interest in its web site, I do not distinguish between browsewraps used to download
software and those used merely to govern use of a site.
9 See infra Part II.A. The American Bar Association ("ABA") Joint Working
Group on Electronic Contracting Practices recently completed a two-part project
on the validity of the assent process in electronic form agreements. The first part of
the project focused on clickwrap agreements. See Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-
Through Agreements: Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57
Bus. LAW. 401 (2001). The second part of the project examined assent in the
context of browsewrap agreements. See Kunz, Browse-Wrap Agreements, supra
note 8.
10 As Richard Craswell states, in some cases, the costs of obtaining a party's
"proper" consent depends heavily on "just what is deemed necessary for [such
party's] consent to be proper." Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability
Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1993).
Craswell further states that as a result, in some cases, such as fine print contracts, it
may be appropriate to adopt a liability rule to avoid the unnecessary expense of
ensuring consent is proper. Id. at 10-11; see also Richard A. Epstein, Contract, Not
Regulation: UCITA and High-Tech Consumers Meet Their Consumer Protection
Critics, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION
ECONOMY' 205, 208-14 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (observing that different software
products require different kinds of solutions which cannot be anticipated by the
government and that current licensing practices have "unleashed an unprecedented
wave of new firms and products" that have benefited consumers).
[Vol. 86, 797
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one party's actual consent.1' The judicial transmutation of
constructive assent into actual assent undermines one of the
fundamental principles underlying contract law-that of
individual autonomy.'2 This Article further argues that, given
the lack of actual agreement to terms, contract law's deference
to industry norms is troubling and misplaced. In order to render
a contract unenforceable on the grounds of unconscionability,
13
the terms of the contract are considered "in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of
the particular trade or case.", 14  Modern contract law and the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") state that contractual
terms that reflect trade usage or industry standards should be
11 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM L. REV. 629, 633 (1943) (stressing the need to "remain fully
aware" that the use of the word "contract" does not "commit us to an
indiscriminate extension of the ordinary contract rules to all contracts"). The effect
of assuming actual assent where there is none has led to some disheartening results.
See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064 RRC, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS
563 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) (upholding a warranty disclaimer as"conspicuous" even though it was contained within product packaging). In reaching
its conclusion, the Rinaldi court relied upon the reasoning of ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, which also upheld a rolling contract, although the disputed terms
pertained to the license grant. As Stephen Friedman points out, there is dicta in
ProCD that cautions against applying that case's rationale to disclaimers of the
implied warranty of merchantability: "That dicta indicates that even if 'money now,
terms later' may be fine for certain types of contracts terms (such as the ProCD
license term which limited the use of the purchase application program and data to
non-commercial purposes), it may not be appropriate for warranty disclaimers."
Stephen E. Friedman, Text and Circumstance: Warranty Disclaimers in a World of
Rolling Contracts, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 677, 693 (2004).
12 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 5-6 (1981). Some scholars argue that, because
consent to form contracts is not voluntary, they are not expressions of individual
autonomy and should not be enforced. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1238 (1983); W.
David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 542 (1971). But see Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1203 (2003) (criticizing as unrealistic objections to form contracts on autonomy
grounds).
13 For a discussion and analysis of unconscionability, see Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
485 (1967). Leff sets forth a framework for analyzing claims of unconscionability
that entails both the manner in which the contract was entered into (i.e. whether
there was "procedural" unconscionability) and whether the terms were fair (i.e.,
whether there was "substantive" unconscionability). Id. at 486-88.
14 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. (2003); see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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interpreted as part of the contract. 15 Corbin suggests that the
test should be whether the terms are "so extreme as to appear
unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of
the time and place.' '16  But where there is a pronounced
unevenness in the bargaining power within the industry, a set of
industry standards or "norms" may be established that reflects
the interests of only one side. 7  Using industry standards as a
guideline where contracts of adhesion' 8 are involved merely
reinforces the overreaching by the party with greater bargaining
power.' 9 While the licensing of software is conceptually different
from the sale of goods, many of the contractual problems arising
from, and associated with, software licensing stem not so much
from the sui generis nature of software itself but from the
15 See U.C.C. 1-303(d) (2006) ("[U]sage of trade ... is relevant in ascertaining the
meaning of the parties' agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of
the agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 (1979) ("Unless otherwise agreed,
a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or a usage
of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives meaning to or
supplements or qualifies their agreement.").
16 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128, at 551 (3d ed.
1963).
17 See Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards
for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOus. L. REV. 1041 (2005) (stating that the U.S.
standard of unconscionability is too high a bar to provide reasonable consumer
protection and proposing minimum contract standards for nonnegotiated
contracts).
18 The introduction of the term "contracts of adhesion" into American
jurisprudence is credited to Edwin Patterson when he described an insurance
contract that an insured merely "adheres" to because he has little choice as to its
terms. Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L.
REV. 198, 222 (1919) [hereinafter Patterson, Life-Insurance Policy]. In a later work,
Patterson attributes the term "contracts of adhesion" to a French jurist, Raymond
Saleilles. Saleilles stated:
Eventually the law must. . . yield to the shading and differences that have
emerged from social relations. There are pretended contracts that have
only the name .... For these .. . the rules of individual interpretation
should undergo important modifications, if only that one might call them,
for lack of a better term, contracts of adhesion, those in which a single will
is exclusively predominant, acting as a unilateral will which dictates its law,
no longer to an individual, but to an indeterminate collectivity ....
Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 833, 856 (1964) [hereinafter Patterson, Contracts].
19 But see Epstein, supra note 10, at 206 (stating that a "convergence in terms
across competitors," should not be treated as collusion but as "evidence only of the
imitation that allows successful practices to succeed while others fail").
[Vol. 86, 797
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concerted effort by licensors to create standard, one-sided terms.
These efforts by software licensors to establish and shape
licensing norms create industry standards that consumers soon
learn to expect, even if consumers are personally opposed to
those norms. This type of private legislation by the software
industry is similar to norms that have been established in other
industries, most notably the insurance industry.2  It is thus
imperative for courts to recognize the norm-setting impact of
enforcing license terms under the guise of contract principles
where the result is actually driven by business or economic
needs.
I propose that the doctrinal concept of "assent" should be
bifurcated into two parts, actual assent and presumed assent.
Actual assent would mean express manifested agreement, not
simply to the transaction, but to each of the individual material
terms. Notice and an opportunity to read the agreement would
not suffice; the licensee must manifest assent to a particular,
disputed term, not just to the transaction and the idea of the
contract. Presumed assent would mean actual assent to the
transaction and the contract generally but not to any individual
or particular contractual term. A contract could thus be formed
with a finding of presumed assent, but presumed assent would
not be interpreted as blanket consent to all the contractual
terms. Whether a given term would be deemed part of the
contract, and enforceable, would depend upon its operative
effect. If the provision concerned the "scope of license" or the
"terms of use" (as further defined) to the software or web site,
then those terms would be enforceable (subject to traditional
contract law defenses) although the licensee's obligation to
perform would be conditioned upon actual notice.
A licensee's right to use software exists only as a result of the
grant of license by the licensor; the scope of license describes the
parameters of that right.2  The licensor, by structuring the
20 See Kessler, supra note 11, at 632 (stating that consumers' ability to shop
around for different contracts is constrained by monopoly enjoyed by the drafting
party).
21 See Patterson, Life-Insurance Policy, supra note 18.
22 But cf Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 7, at 481 (stating that courts should
analyze the property claim underlying electronic agreements directly rather than
obscuring the issues in contract theory. Lemley states that to claim "that
browsewraps are enforceable only where the drafter already had a right to prevent
2007]
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agreement as one that is nonnegotiable, has made a decision to
create a business model based upon those license terms. The"scope of license" terms (and the license fee) are the material
terms of the transaction, the terms that the licensor believes are
significant enough to warrant "deal breaker" status. The
licensee has no rights to the intellectual property being licensed
which preexist the license grant or exist independently of it.
On the other hand, the licensor should not be able to lump
terms having nothing to do with the use of the product or service
under the "scope of license" or "terms of use" provision. The
substance of the provision, and not the caption or heading, is
determinative. The scope of license or terms of use include only
those restrictions on the licensee's ability to use the product or
service. Those restrictions, however, must directly relate to, and
arise out of, the license grant. If the operative effect of a term is
to impose any obligation upon the licensee unrelated to how the
technology is being used, or if the effect is to strip the licensee of
any rights or remedies otherwise available to the licensee, then
the court should require actual assent to such term.
Often contained in nonnegotiated licenses are "free rider"• • 23.
provisions, included in an agreement because the drafter has no
incentive not to include them.24 Furthermore, even if these
provisions were deal breakers for the licensor, the licensee has
a particular use is the functional equivalent of refusing to enforce those
browsewraps").
23 Webster's Dictionary defines a "free ride" as "something (as entertainment,
acclaim, or a profit) obtained without the usual cost or effort." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 491 (1988). I adopt the Webster's Dictionary
definition of the term to describe "free-rider" contractual provisions that are
included in a form agreement and are not consciously bargained for by the licensee
or the licensor. I use the term with a wink to its meaning in the law and economics
literature. See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351
(1991); Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A
Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem, 45 ECONOMETRICA 783 (1977) (describing
the "Free Rider Problem" where "the achievement of Pareto-optimal allocation of
resources via decentralized methods in the presence of public goods is
fundamentally incompatible with individual incentives"); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2005)
[hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] (defining free riding as obtaining a benefit from
someone else's investment).
24 See discussion infra Part II; see also Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate:
Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 837, 842-45 (2006) (discussing whether market pressure can discipline e-
businesses' selection of standard forms).
[Vol. 86, 797
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preexisting rights that arise independently from the license grant
that counterbalance the licensor's intellectual property rights.
There is no reason for either party's rights to outweigh the other
party's. The term should not be enforced simply because it is in
the contract. The nonenforcement of the term would result in a
gap in the contract. The courts should then refer to the U.C.C.
25 26or to other applicable law to fill in any such gaps.
I have divided this Article into two parts. Part I proposes an
analytical approach that reconciles the business realities
involved in software transactions with contract law principles.
The proposed approach requires first analyzing whether the
putative licensee has assented and the nature of that assent (i.e.,
whether it is general assent to engage in a transaction or whether
it manifests assent to the disputed term). The second step
requires determining what terms govern the activity based upon
the nature of the assent. Part II summarizes and analyzes the
current case law using my proposed analytical approach. I
suggest that often courts have contorted contract law doctrine to
enforce terms that were never actually agreed to, but which
nonetheless were commercially reasonable, as explained in Part
I.
Admittedly, much of this Article and my proposal is generally
applicable to form contracts that are contracts of adhesion.27 I
choose to limit my discussion in this Article to software licenses
because, while the problem created by licenses to consumers is
25 As of the writing of this Article, a draft of the Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts is being circulated by the American Law Institute. Presumably,
a final adopted version would serve as an appropriate source for gap filler terms.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, Discussion Draft (Mar.
30, 2007) (on file with author).
26 In the absence of express legislative guidance or case law on a particular issue,
the courts would resolve issues guided by the standard of reasonableness. Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner refer to this type of default allocation based upon
reasonableness as a "majoritarian default rule." See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989). Craswell points out that majoritarian default rules are
similar to liability rules, and that both are preferable where transaction costs to
negotiate individual contracts are high. See Craswell, supra note 10, at 14; see also
id. at 32-34 (discussing the problems related to preexisting default rules).
27 For a discussion of the issues raised by form contracts that are contracts of
adhesion, see Rakoff, supra note 12. I have previously discussed the disconcerting
effects of applying interpretation rules to provisions in form contracts. See Nancy S.
Kim, Evolving Business and Sucial Norms and Interpretation Rules: The Need for a
Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REV. 506, 539-49 (2005).
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similar to that created by other types of consumer form
agreements, the application of the solution must be industry
specific. 28 In other words, the matter of to "what terms" we can
presume assent would require consideration of the nature of the
transaction and the business needs associated with that
particular industry.
The primary advantage of the approach outlined in this
Article is that it defaults to the U.C.C., other applicable law,
and to ordinary (as opposed to industry specific) standards of
reasonableness. By contrast, the current law governing
nonnegotiated licenses defaults to contract terms that are clearly
biased in favor of the licensor. Shifting the burden created by
the nonnegotiated form of the contract accomplishes two
important objectives. First, it eliminates free-rider provisions,
which are those terms that do not affect the licensor's decision toenterinto he • 30enter into the transaction. Those provisions which are not free
28 Electronic contracting may also raise its own unique set of issues. See Michael
H. Dessent, Browse-Wraps, Click-Wraps and Cyberlaw: Our Shrinking (Wrap)
World, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 14-16 (2002) (noting, among other problems,
the difficulties of proving electronic signature fraud and the lack of ceremony
associated with electronic contracting); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 477-85
(2002) (discussing the various social and cognitive factors that may make consumers
more inclined to treat electronic transactions casually). But Hillman & Rachlinski
conclude that while "e-commerce changes some of the dynamics of standard-form
contracting in interesting and novel ways . . . these differences do not call for the
development of a radically different legal regime." Id. at 432.
29 Using the U.C.C. as a "gap filler" does not include preamended section 1-205
or revised 1-303 (amended 2001) which incorporates trade usage where industry
norms have been established through adhesion contracts. See discussion, infra Part
I.B.3.
30 Mueller has noted that "so much contractual language" is retained because of
the feeling that it "can do no harm and might do some good." Addison Mueller,
Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576, 580 n.22 (1969). This attitude is
expressed by Michael Kinsley, the editor of the online magazine Slate.com. When
asked about the clickwrap agreement on the Slate.com web site, Kinsley admitted,
"Yes, it's absurd." But he then added that it was no more absurd than agreements
at other web sites. See James Gleick, Click OK to Agree, http://www.around.com/
agree.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). Lemley and McGowan have referred to
adoption of standardized terms by industry players as a "'network effect' of a sort-
those who draft contracts of adhesion with one-sided terms benefit if their
competitors adopt the same one-sided terms." Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479,
589 (1998); see also Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1206 (describing free-rider
provisions as "socially inefficient"). Korobkin argues that the reason form
agreements require scrutiny is that buyers make decisions only in a "boundedly
rational" manner, which provides incentives to sellers to draft nonsalient contract
[Vol. 86, 797
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riders, on the other hand, will require actual assent and will be
called to the reader's attention. A requirement of an affirmative
manifestation of consent requires the consumer to consider
whether the proposed transaction in fact is what he or she had
bargained for. Forcing the consumer to click numerous times
may be a hassle for the consumer, but if we are to take the
notion of contractual assent seriously, it should be.3' To do
otherwise would be to privilege transaction facilitation 32 over the
other objectives of contract law, namely enforcing the intent of
the parties. Second, the resultant consumer frustration may
motivate the customer to select another, less contractually
demanding, licensor, or it may encourage licensors to streamline
terms to their own advantage, whether or not such terms are efficient. Id. The
notion of bounded rationality was first espoused by Herbert Simon, a Nobel Prize
winning economist who suggested that because human beings are limited in their
computational abilities, they make choices that are satisfactory rather than optimal.
Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 99-100
(1955) (noting that the concept of "economic man" is in need of "fairly drastic
revision" and "the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a
kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the
computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in
the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist"). Simon further stated:
Because of the psychological limits of the organism . . . actual human
rationality-striving can at best be an extremely crude and simplified
approximation to the kind of global rationality that is implied, for example,
by game-theoretical models. While the approximations that organisms
employ may not be the best-even at the levels of computational
complexity they are able to handle-it is probable that a great deal can be
learned about possible mechanisms from an examination of the schemes of
approximation that are actually employed by human and other organisms.
Id. at 101.
31 In this Article, I am primarily concerned with which party should bear the
burden of a failure to obtain actual assent. I do not address the issue of the type of
liability that should attach where "proper" consent is lacking. Richard Craswell
argues that property rules are preferable under any autonomy-based theory that
attaches importance to a right-holder's actual rather than hypothetical consent. See
Craswell, supra note 10, at 8. In many cases, however, Craswell states that a liability
rule is preferable because the transaction costs of obtaining informed consent are
too high. Id. at 11. Interestingly, in many software licensing cases, the failure to
obtain proper consent would result in misuse by the nonconsenting party. In any
event, this Article is primarily concerned with the issue of what should constitute
proper consent and who should bear the burden of the associated transaction costs
in its obtainment. To the extent that I do address the consequences of a failure to
obtain proper consent, I do so in my discussion of gap fillers in Part IV.
32 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass
Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335
(1996). The authors argue that nonnegotiated licenses are an efficient tool for
standard, mass market transactions. Id. at 342-43.
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agreements and provide less onerous terms to avoid losing
customers.33 The consumer is forced to weigh the contractual
provisions as part of his or her cost-benefit calculation inS 34
entering into the transaction. As it should be under contract
law, under my approach, the contractual terms would more
closely reflect what the parties have bargained for, thereby
enhancing the economic efficiency of the exchange.35
36My proposal is admittedly contrary to the current
assumption under contract law that all provisions in a contract
reflect the bargain or that manifested assent is tantamount to
blanket assent 37 to terms that are not "unreasonable., 38 I argue
33 Craswell states that if it is feasible for the drafting party to point out all the
contractual clauses and explain them orally, her failure to do so should bar her from
enforcing any clauses that were not so explained. Craswell, supra note 10, at 59. He
acknowledges, however, that many contracts contain so many clauses that they
could not all be orally explained prior to every sale. Id. Craswell thus recommends
that in such cases, a liability rule should apply which would prevent the drafting
party "from enforcing only those obligations that were both not pointed out and
deemed unreasonable by the court." Id. (emphasis added). My proposal strives to
obtain an alternative result, the streamlining of agreements which would circumvent
the need for imposition of liability rules but would, in most cases, achieve the same
result by resorting to gap fillers. See infra Part ll.B.
34 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 472, question whether "e-businesses
will compete for customers with more advantageous contract terms" but note that
the Internet "might be producing some diversity in the contract terms e-businesses
offer," and that "comparison shopping among standard terms actually might pay
off." The authors speculate, however, that the diversity of terms "could be a
product of the novelty of e-business and therefore might not persist as e-commerce
develops." Id.
35 See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract. Law and
Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 585 (1990) (noting a
"tendency toward inefficiency in transactions involving consumer form contracts").
36 Although my proposal is contrary to current contract law, it is not the first time
an argument has been made in favor of actual assent. See, e.g., Clarke B. Whittier,
The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAL. L. REV. 441, 443 (1929)
(critiquing the "objective" theory of contracts of the First Restatement and
proposing that using "actual assent" as the basis for "mutual assent" except where
there has been a "careless misleading which induces a reasonable belief in assent"
would lead to better results).
37 Karl Llewellyn famously stated:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler plate clauses, we can recognize
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in
fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the
broad type of transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing more is
a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent
terms ... which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the
dickered terms. The fine print which has not been read has no business to
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that a consumer's assent to the transaction should not be
transmuted into blanket assent to each individual term of a
nonnegotiated contract.39  A requirement of actual assent
reallocates the current balance of burdens away from the
consumer to the party in a better position to accommodate
them.4° As Friedrich Kessler wrote, "freedom of contract must
mean different things for different types of contracts. Its
meaning must change with the social importance of the type of
contract and with the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author
of the standardized contract.",4' Vendors have been quick to
take advantage of new modes of contracting to accommodate
new types of products and services;42 it is time that they shared
some of the costs associated with these forms of contracting as
well.
cut under the reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute
the dominant and only real expression of the agreement.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960); see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 461 (defining Llewelyn's
notion of "blanket assent" as meaning that "although consumers do not read
standard terms, so long as their formal presentation and substance are reasonable,
consumers comprehend the existence of the terms and agree to be bound to them").
38 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 455 (noting that the current legal
approach to standard form agreements supports Llewellyn's view that the law
should create "a presumption of assent (or 'blanket assent') to standard terms ....
Llewellyn based his framework on the perspective that, so long as the terms are not
unfair in presentation or substance, courts should presume consumers' 'blanket
assent' to the details they may have ignored.").
39 See Rakoff, supra note 12, at 1205-06 (criticizing Llewelyn for overlooking that
boilerplate clauses often reflect the attorney's "expertise" rather than the business
person's).
40 See Jane M. Rolling, The UCC Under Wraps: Exposing the Need for More
Notice to Consumers of Computer Software with Shrinkwrapped Licenses, 104 COM.
L.J. 197, 228 (1999) (arguing that materials terms of a transaction should be
available prior to purchase of software product); Recent Decision, Limitations on
Credit Card Holders' Liability for Unauthorized Purchases, 13 STAN. L. REV. 150,
154 (1960-61) (stating that it may be proper to determine a credit card issuer's
liability by "standards which would require it to bear a greater share of the risk of
loss").
41 Kessler, supra note 11, at 642.
42 See Deborah W. Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the
Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1205, 1215-17
(2000) (querying why "the risk of poor management decisions" resulting in
defective products should fall on the consumer rather than the management of the
company).
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I
THE PROBLEM OF ASSENT AND THE NONNEGOTIATED
LICENSE
Let's say that you are downloading software from YOUCH,43
a social networking web site. Before you can start the download
process, a clickwrap agreement appears. In large lettering, a
statement appears that you must click the "I agree" box in order
to proceed. You click the "I agree" box without reading the
terms contained in the electronic agreement. Are you bound by
the terms of the clickwrap agreement? Assume further that one
of the terms of the clickwrap agreement requires you to permit
YOUCH to release your personal information to advertisers.
Another provision prohibits you from installing software that
blocks pop-up ads. Assume that a pop-up ad releases a virus
that infects and deletes some of your files. Let's assume further
that desktop icons appear as a result of your use of YOUCH's
software. You try to delete those icons and remove YOUCH's
software, but are unable to do so. You seek assistance from
YOUCH's customer support, but are told that, pursuant to the
terms of their clickwrap agreement, YOUCH is not responsible
for any viruses caused by use of its web site or its software. To
make matters worse, you have just been informed by snickering
acquaintances that your profile is being distributed by YOUCH
to advertise its "Lonely Singles Meet Your Match" marketing
campaign. Your grinning digital image along with a statement
about your favorite songs, books, and foods are distributed far
and wide by YOUCH's marketers in the form of a jiggling pop-
up box-a use which you ignorantly agreed to when you clicked
the "I agree" box.
Far from being the product of this author's overactive
imagination, such contract terms are common on networking
web sites,44 even if their enforceability has not yet been tested in
43 YOUCH is a product of the author's imagination.
44 See, for example, the end user license agreement on www.kazaa.com, which
states:
Sharman reserves the right to run advertisements and promotions on
Kazaa.
S.. You agree that Sharman is not responsible or liable for any loss or
damage of any sort incurred as the result of any such dealings or as the
result of the presence of such advertisers on Kazaa and/ or kazaa.com.
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a court of law.45  Generally, absent a finding of
unconscionability, the terms of clickwrap licenses have been held
46to be enforceable. There are several problems with relyingupon the doctrine of unconscionability to prevent enforcement
... You agree, so long as you have not entirely deleted Kazaa from your
computer, not to take any action, including downloading other software, to
disable or block the display of advertising by the Software.
Kazaa.com, End User License Agreement, §§ 7.1, 7.5, 7.6, http://www.kazaa.com/us/
eula.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
See also the terms of use at www.myspace.com, which state:
MySpace takes no responsibility for third party advertisements or third
party applications that are posted on or through the MySpace Services, nor
does it take any responsibility for the goods or services provided by its
advertisers. MySpace is not responsible for the conduct, whether online or
offline, of any User of the MySpace Services. MySpace assumes no
responsibility for any error, omission, interruption, deletion, defect, delay
in operation or transmission, communications line failure, theft or
destruction or unauthorized access to, or alteration of, any User or
Member communication. MySpace is not responsible for any problems or
technical malfunction of any telephone network or lines, computer online
systems, servers or providers, computer equipment, software, failure of any
email or players due to technical problems or traffic congestion on the
Internet or on any of the MySpace Services or combination thereof,
including any injury or damage to Users or to any person's computer
related to or resulting from participation or downloading materials in
connection with the MySpace Services. Under no circumstances shall
MySpace be responsible for any loss or damage, including personal injury
or death, resulting from use of the MySpace Services, attendance at a
MySpace event, from any User Content posted on or through the MySpace
Services, or from the conduct of any Users of the MySpace Services,
whether online or offline.
MySpace.com, Terms of Use Agreement, § 12, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.myspace
.com/Modules/Common/Pages/TermsConditions.aspx.
The terms of service on www.friendster.com state:
By publishing, displaying or uploading (collectively, "Posting") any text,
links, photos, video, messages or other data or information (collectively,
"Content") on or to the Website (including on or to your profile), you
automatically grant, and you represent and warrant that you have the right
to grant, to Friendster an irrevocable, perpetual, nonexclusive, fully-paid
and worldwide license to use, copy, perform, display, and distribute such
Content and to prepare derivative works of, or incorporate into other
works, such Content and to grant and authorize sublicenses of the
foregoing.
Friendster.com, Friendster Terms of Service, § 5(b), http://www.friendster.com/info/
tos.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
45 See Nancy S. Kim, Sacrificing Privacy to the Web Gods, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE-SFGATE, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/
a/2008/03/06/EDENVAIND.DTL.
46 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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of nonnegotiated agreements. First, courts have generally been
reluctant to strike down agreements on the basis of
unconscionability provided that there was notice and an
opportunity to read the contract terms.47 In addition, the
doctrine of unconscionability looks to industry norms to
determine whether a term is enforceable, which may be
problematic where the norms are set by an industry player with
greater bargaining power. For example, consumers may not like
the fact that their credit card companies charge them hefty late
finance charges, but they lack an alternative. Credit card late
finance charges are not unconscionable because all credit card
48companies charge them.
There is another problem49 with employing the doctrine of
unconscionability in the nonnegotiated agreement context, and
that is one that strikes at the integrity of contract doctrine. How
can a consumer be deemed to have assented to terms that he or
she never read? Even if the consumer was given an
47 See Blake Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual Formalism:
Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 233, 261-
66 (2003); Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58
ALA L. REV. 73, 91 (2006) (stating that courts have become more formulaic in their
application of the doctrine, thereby undermining the doctrine's "safety net"
function); see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1067 (2006) (conducting an empirical study of cases tending to show that claims of
unconscionability are difficult, although not impossible, to win). Elsewhere, I have
discussed the limitations of the unconscionability doctrine, including a high
standard of unfairness, review of events limited to events existing at the time of
contract formation, doctrinal vagueness, and judicial discretion. See Kim, supra
note 27, at 550-53.
48 In response to consumer credit-related concerns, state governments have
enacted special legislation that regulates the substantive content of credit contracts,
as well as expands the disclosure requirements imposed upon creditors. See Jeffrey
Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV.
841 (1977).
49 Many scholars have also criticized the doctrine of unconscionability on the
grounds that it undermines efficient business practices. See Richard A. Epstein,
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 294-95 (1975);
Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1387 (1977).
50 But see Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 743
(2002). Professor Hillman has stated, "Although courts and commentators focus on
the time of contract formation, this analysis actually yields little fruit.... [B]ut few
parties think about this technical question, so the issue has little real-world
relevance." Id. at 744. Furthermore, Hillman notes that "even if the time of
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opportunity to read the terms, if the consumer never actually
read them, there could not be agreement to those terms.5'
Unconscionability is a defense to contract enforcement, meaning
that a contract must have already been formed.
Contract law's present insistence upon blanket assent means
that if we wish to enforce any of the terms, we have to enforce
all of the terms, provided that an applicable defense does not
apply. In other words, if you had actually read the agreement,
you might have agreed to the provision prohibiting you from
using YOUCH's web site to market to its members; yet you
might have been unwilling to agree to the use of your image in
YOUCH's advertisements. Yet if we want to enforce YOUCH's
right to prohibit your marketing activity on its web site, we must
also say that YOUCH has a right to use your image in its
advertising. The only way for you to escape this situation would
be if you could successfully use the unconscionability doctrine to
defend against enforcement. But your use of the doctrine of
unconscionability would likely fail if, for example, the practice of
using member profiles in banner ads for social networking sites
was commonplace; you were simply unaware of it because it was
the first time that you had joined a social networking web site.
In this section, I set forth my proposed approach for analyzing
52nonnegotiated software licenses. Part A provides a brief
contract formation is accessible, it does not tell us very much" because additional
terms could be agreed to by the parties or barred by courts. Id. at 744-45.
51 For a general discussion of consent, see Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). See also Richard Craswell, Contract
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
Some contract theorists view manifested assent to the transaction as actual assent.
For example, Randy Barnett has stated that clicking an "I agree" icon demonstrates
assent whether or not the terms that are being agreed to have been read. See
Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635-
36 (2002).
52 Other commentators have suggested other approaches. Clayton Gillette, for
example, has suggested that the issue of assent should be disregarded in the rolling
contract situation. In its place, the presence (or absence) of representation by a
third party should be used to serve roughly the same functions as assent. See
generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, in
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY' 241
(Jane K. Winn ed., 2006). Michael Meyerson has stated that no new doctrine needs
to be created for consumer form contracts. Expressly recognizing that consumers
who sign form contracts typically do not read them, he has suggested instead that
the courts should focus on how a "reasonable drafter" should understand the assent
of a customer rather than assuming objective agreement to all terms simply because
the contract has been signed. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of
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discussion of assent in contract law, and explains the concepts of
actual assent and presumed assent. Part B focuses on the scope
of presumed assent, and introduces an analytical method that
makes contract enforceability contingent upon the operative
impact of a particular contractual term.
A. Actual Assent Versus Presumed Assent
One of the basic requirements for contract formation is
mutual assent. 53 Mutual assent has not been interpreted to mean
agreement to all the terms of a contract. Provided that the
parties demonstrate mutual assent to the transaction,
disagreement about the meaning of a particular term will not
nullify its existence. The Restatement expressly distinguishes
between terms that have been expressly agreed upon and those
that are implied in law:
(1) A term of a promise or agreement is that portion of the
intention or assent manifested which relates to a particular
matter.
(2) A term of a contract is that portion of the legal relations
resulting from the promise or set of promises which relates to a
particular matter, whether or not the parties manifest an
intention to create those relations.54
The existing contract interpretation rules then govern how to
determine the meaning of contract terms. For example, some
courts will determine the meaning of a term in accordance with• ,,55
its ordinary usage or "plain meaning, although many courts
will examine such meaning in the light of circumstances existing
at the time the contract was made.56 The relevant circumstances
Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1263, 1265-66 (1993).
53 For example, under the Restatement, contract formation requires a bargain in
which there is both a "manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange" and
consideration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979).
54 Id. at § 5.
55 See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 833
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("The plain meaning of a policy provision governs, and an
insured's reasonable expectations are not considered except where the policy
provisions are ambiguous.").
56 See Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458, 464-65 (Alaska 2004) ("Washington courts
reject the 'plain meaning' rule of contractual interpretation and interpret the terms
of a contract in light of conduct, subsequent acts of the parties, and circumstances
surrounding contract formation, as well as the literal meaning of the language
itself."); see also Pac. Gas & Elect. Co. v. Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644
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include course of dealing, course of performance, and trade
usage.57  The courts will also look to the "reasonable
expectations" of the parties in determining whether to enforce
contractual terms. 8
1. Is Software Really Different?
Software licenses occupy a unique place in the law because
they raise both contract law issues and issues of proprietorship.59
While the form of the agreement may vary, all software licenses
expressly retain ownership of intellectual property rights in the
(Cal. 1968) ("A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written
instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to be clear and
unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or
presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not
attained.").
57 See generally Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th
Cir. 1981); C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa
1995).
58 Wessells v. Dep't of Highways, 562 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Alaska 1977) ("Contracts
should be interpreted to comply with the reasonable expectations of the parties.");
see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); C & J
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Patterson,
Contracts, supra note 18, at 858 (noting the tendency of courts to interpret form
contracts to mean "what a reasonable buyer would expect it to mean" thus
protecting "the weaker party's expectation at the expense of the stronger"). The"reasonable expectations" doctrine is most often used in insurance form contract
cases, although its underlying rationale is equally applicable to consumer form
contracts in general. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 459-60; Meyerson,
supra note 52, at 1279-82; Patterson, Contracts, supra note 18, at 858. See also
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970), for a general analysis of insurance form contracts.
59 The issue of whether web sites should be treated as "property" is the subject of
much debate. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 27 (2000); Shuhba Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 387 (2003); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 217; Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of
the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and
Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003) [hereinafter Lemley, Place and
Cyberspace]; Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property,
75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997) (book review) [hereinafter Lemley, Romantic
Authorship]. Lemley notes that the rise of the "property rights" view of intellectual
property coincides with the widespread use of the term "intellectual property"
instead of patent, copyright, and/or trademark law, and suggests that the "rhetoric
of property" may make it tempting to treat intellectual property as an absolute right
to exclude. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 23, at 1033-35, 1071. Setting aside the
issue of whether intellectual property is the same (or should be treated the same) as
tangible property, I would like to focus on the proprietary interest the licensor has
in the software as a product of the licensor's business.
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licensor while permitting the licensee to use a product that is
keenly susceptible to copyright infringement, misapplication,
and abuse. 60 Many commentators dispute that software is-or
should be-licensed, not sold, notwithstanding the purported
license agreement. 61 Although the issue of whether software is
in fact licensed and not sold is an important one, for the
purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the
licensor has an interest in how the software and/or web site
information is being used because the use of such software
62and/or web site information affects the licensor's business. In
particular, the reproducibility of software has the potential for
economic damage to the licensor in a way that many other goods
do not.63 Many courts, understanding the practical aspects and
limitations of selling software, contort existing contract doctrine
to enforce agreements that in other contexts would be
unenforceable for lack of assent.64 In so doing, however, the
60 The Second Circuit in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17
(2d Cir. 2002), noted that it is this manipulable quality that differentiates software
from other goods: "Downloadable software. . . is scarcely a 'tangible' good, and, in
part because software may be obtained, copied, or transferred effortlessly at the
stroke of a computer key, licensing of such Internet products has assumed a vast
importance in recent years." Id. at 29 n.13; see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Issues in
Licensing: An Introduction, 42 HOuS. L. REV. 941, 942 (2005) (describing
conditional transactions as licenses).
61 See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and
the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577, 581
(1994) (stating that "the retention of 'title' in the 'licensor' is ... a legal fiction" and
that "[ajlthough the license purports to create a reversionary interest in the licensor
at the termination of the license, few if any copies of licensed software are ever
returned to their licensors"); Lloyd L. Rich, Mass Market Software and the
Shrinkwrap License, 23 COLO. LAW. 1321, 1322 (June 1994) (noting that because
licensors typically do not retain title as a security interest, the license does not
expire at a specified time, and the licensee does not make periodic payments, the
shrinkwrap "license" is probably actually a sale). Contra H. Ward Classen,
Fundamentals of Software Licensing, 37 IDEA 1, 5-6 (1996) ("[T]he sale of
software is typically not a 'sale' within the meaning of section 109 [of the Copyright
Act of 1976], but rather a license accompanied by a license agreement. ... );
Nimmer, supra note 60, at 941-42 (stating that licenses are a form of conditional
transaction which is "by far" the most common type of transaction in information).
The Seventh Circuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir.
1996), expressly reserved the license versus sale discussion for "another day."
62 I address the issue of whether software is, or should be, licensed or sold in a
forthcoming article. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008
BYU L. REV. (forthcoming, Oct. 2008) [hereafter Kim, Licensing Dilemma].
63 Of course, there are other products that are susceptible to unauthorized
reproduction, most notably music CDs, cassettes, movie videos, and DVDs.
64 See, e.g., Specht, 306 F.3d 17; ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.
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courts establish a precedent that applies to all types of
nonnegotiated contracts, including those having nothing to do
with software.
My proposed approach starts with the basic question, does the
license meet the technical requirements of contract formation?
This seemingly simple and straightforward question has complex
implications stemming from contract law's failure to provide a
middle ground between assent and no assent. A finding of
assent leads to a finding of contract formation; on the other
hand, a finding of no assent means that no contract was
formed. Not surprisingly, courts that wish to uphold a
particular transaction or type of transaction have been more
willing to find assent even in the absence of bargaining power.
"Assent" has thus been construed to mean acquiescence rather
than agreement. While one of the objectives of contract law is
universally acknowledged as being the promotion of individual
autonomy, "assent" is thus stripped of any requirement of
66voluntariness or volition. While such a passive notion of assent
seems inconsistent with the very reason why we enforce
contracts, in fact, it reflects another of contract law's goals,
which is to encourage and facilitate economic transactions.67
65 In the absence of a finding of mutual assent, the courts might yet find an
implied-in-law, or quasi, contract. Quasi contracts, based in equity, are legal
fictions imposed in order to prevent unjust enrichment. See Kammer Asphalt
Paving Co. v. E. China Twp. Sch., 504 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Mich. 1993); Cascaden v.
Magryta, 225 N.W. 511, 512 (Mich. 1929); Luithly v. Cavalier Corp., No. 98-5507,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10653, at *12-14 (E.D. Tenn. May 20, 1999). In a
transaction involving presumed assent, the parties intend to enter into the
transaction with an awareness that it shall be governed by contractual terms, but do
not actually assent to those terms.
66 See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L.J. 704, 728 n.49 (1931) ("Agreement does not even today carry any ...
connotation of real willingness. Acquiescence in the lesser evil is all that need be
understood.").
67 See Kessler, supra note 11, at 630 (noting that "freedom of contract" is both
practical and moral). Kessler stated:
The individualism of our rules of contract law, of which freedom of
contract is the most powerful symbol, is closely tied up with the ethics of
free enterprise capitalism and the ideals of justice of a mobile society of
small enterprisers, individual merchants and independent craftsmen....
With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate trend of
competitive capitalism towards monopoly, the meaning of contract has
changed radically.
Id. at 640. For discussions about the socioeconomic benefits of contracts, see
generally A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983);
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Contracts, while important in clarifying the terms of
transactions, also stall their progression. Simplifying the
contracting process-by discouraging or even preventing
negotiations-thus shortens the time from transaction inception
to completion. The transaction is thus streamlined by allowing
assent to be found even where the contracting party did not have
actual knowledge of a particular term. In actuality, if one did
not know of a particular contractual term, one could not have
assented to such term. In contract law, however, provided that
the contracting party demonstrated assent to entering into the
transaction, 68 the courts have not much concerned themselves
with whether the party had actual knowledge, and thus actually
assented to, the contractual term at issue. Instead, the courts
have focused on notice and an opportunity to read the relevant
contractual terms.
Notice and an opportunity to read contractual terms are only
somewhat helpful in establishing the existence of assent. While
a rejection of those terms after notification does in fact establish
nonconsent to the terms, the opposite is not true. Where the
consumer has no power to negotiate the terms, a failure to reject
those terms does not establish agreement or consent to the
terms. This does not, however, mean that contractual terms
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 133-344
(1954) ("[I]n a commercial and industrial society, a claim or want or demand of
society that promises be kept and that undertakings be carried out in good faith, a
social interest in the stability of promises as a social and economic institution,
becomes of the first importance .... ); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to
the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986).
Societal changes necessitate a dynamic approach to contract law that takes into
account all the primary underlying objectives of contract law. See generally Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743,
1745 (2000) (describing dynamic contract law as first effectuating the intent of the
parties and then applying the rules that a legislator would use, taking into account
relevant policy considerations); Kim, supra note 27. While wealth redistribution is
not considered one of the objectives of contract law, it is often considered to be one
of the goals of the law more generally. See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the
Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and
Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995).
Another generally accepted contract law objective is the protection of reasonable
expectations. See Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 157,
190-201 (1989); Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests of Substance-Promised
Advantages, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1945).
68 With shrinkwrap agreements, the courts have not even required an opportunity
to read the contract terms prior to entering into the transaction. See ProCD, 86
F.3d at 1447.
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should not be upheld where they are offered on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis. In some cases, assent may be presumed because
the term is one that the putative licensee would have agreed to if
he or she had actually read it. In other cases, assent may be
presumed because the licensor would not have agreed to the
transaction without it. Thus, assent can be presumed either
when the term is unobjectionable or when it is a deal-breaker
term, so significant to the licensor's business objectives that a
refusal to accept the terms would have terminated the
69transaction. If the provision is one affecting the scope of the
license, or the terms of use, it should be upheld. 70 The licensee
does not have an independent or preexisting right to use the
intellectual property of the licensor. The licensor, furthermore,
is not required to provide a license to the licensee, and certainly
not on whatever terms the licensee chooses. A lack of actual
assent should not, therefore, prevent contract formation because
in many cases, assent can be presumed. Assent, however, cannot
be presumed in all cases, or with respect to all terms in a
contract. A putative licensee might be presumed to have
assented to certain terms, but not to others. In the next Section,
I will discuss which terms should be enforced in the absence of
actual assent.
B. The Operative Effect of Terms: Why It Matters
As explained above, if a party manifests actual assent to a
contract, then that contractual term becomes part of the
transaction. This Section addresses what happens where a party
manifests intent to enter into a transaction, but does not
manifest assent to a particular term in the contract. Where
parties dispute the meaning of a particular term, or have omitted
69 These terms are discussed in greater detail below, see infra Part I.B.
70 The license grant provision should be upheld as far as the contract analysis
goes. There may, however, be other, noncontract law based, policy reasons for
nonenforcement. For example, a court may decide not to enforce a license grant
provision if the provision is held to be anticompetitive. Margaret Jane Radin has"urge[d] that policy arguments about [information] property . . . take explicit
cognizance of other policy considerations . . . [namely] contractual ordering,
competition, and freedom of expression." Margaret J. Radin, A Comment on
Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 23 (2006);
see also Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO
L. REV. 55, 102-08 (2001) (discussing the impact and effect of price discrimination
on copyrighted works, including the consumer use restriction in ProCD).
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it altogether, courts will often determine meaning by reference
to trade usage and industry norms.71 Where control in a given
industry is concentrated, there is often a systemic lack of
bargaining power. Contract terms are imposed in a transaction
by the party with greater bargaining power; these terms become
duplicated and standardized within the industry. These terms
thus evolve into standard terms in form contracts, offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, and representative of industry norms.
This type of private legislation has occurred in many industries,
including the insurance industry, the consumer credit industry,
and in the subject of this Article, the software industry.72 Given
the systemic lack of bargaining power in the consumer software•73
industry, notice and/or an opportunity to read terms has little
or no meaning-and does not mean that the consumer has acted
either knowingly or willingly. On the other hand, the party has
manifested a desire to participate in the transaction. Does that,
however, mean that she or he should be bound to all of its
terms?
Assume a consumer logs onto a web site and clicks "I agree"
without reading the multipage electronic contract. Has the
consumer agreed to those contract terms? Common sense
would tell us no. One could not agree to something that one has
never read. Barring any unconscionable terms, however, the
answer is likely yes under existing law even though our
hypothetical consumer could not have actually agreed to those
contract terms if she never read them, even if she had the
71 For a critical view of the use of business norms, see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996). Bernstein states that while the drafters of
the U.C.C. sought to incorporate business norms in an effort to make commercial
law more responsive to business realities, "they failed to recognize that this
approach would fundamentally alter the very reality they sought to reflect, and
would do so in ways that would have undesirable effects on commercial
relationships and would undermine the Code's own stated goals of promoting
flexibility in commercial transactions." Id. at 1769.
72 See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 275, 316-19 (2003) (discussing how consumers acquiesce to licensing
transactions because they effectively have no other way to purchase software given
the evolution of the "licensing norm").
73 A systemic lack of bargaining power exists in other industries as well, but I
focus my discussion in this Article on the software industry and the unique issues
that arise with respect to licenses.
[Vol. 86, 797
Clicking and Cringing
opportunity to do so.7" What the courts actually mean when they
say the consumer has demonstrated assent is two things: (1) the
consumer expressed a willingness to engage in the transaction;
and (2) the consumer can be presumed to have agreed to the
contract terms. There was no actual agreement to those terms
where the consumer has not actually read them. Contract law
imputes agreement and does not require actual assent where
there was an opportunity to read the contract. The assumption
is that the consumer would have agreed to the terms because
they are reasonable and/or because the consumer had no choice
but to agree to them. This begs the question, to what terms can
the consumer be presumed to have assented?
In reality, the above-described behavior on the part of the
consumer is not so much an expression of intent to contract as it
is a ceding to the reality of his or her situation-the consumer
clicks without reading because he or she knows that it does not
matter what the contract says. If the consumer wants to enter
into the transaction, the consumer will accept all of its terms.
Libertarians might ask, so what? 75 The consumer is a free
agent, at liberty to visit another site. Nobody is forcing the
consumer to purchase goods from this particular e-tailer, or use
76this web site or software. But in fact, in many cases, due to the
systemic bargaining imbalance within a particular market
segment, the terms may have become so uniform and
standardized that the consumer effectively has no choice. 77 It is
not a viable option for the consumer to decline the terms of any
74 Many scholars have written at length on the reasons why consumers do not
read standard form contracts. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL.
L. REV. 305 (1986); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 445-54; Korobkin,
supra note 12; Meyerson, supra note 52; Slawson, supra note 12.
75 As Thomas Joo keenly observes, however, the use of "normal" human
behavior as a standard "may promote libertarianism but it may also serve its
nemesis, majoritarianism .... Enforcing a contract in accord with the expectations
of most people rewards conformist expectations and punishes nonconformist
expectations." Thomas W. Joo, Common Sense and Contract Law: Fear of a
Normative Planet?, 16 TOURo L. REV. 1037, 1047 (2000).
76 For a criticism of the "economic libertarian" view, see Posner, supra note 67, at
318. Eric Posner notes that the historical survival of usury laws responds to a basic
social problem and that "those who endorse the policy of poverty reduction through
the welfare system should support restrictive contract laws." Id.
77 See Mueller, supra note 30, at 580 (noting that consumers effectively have no
choice in seeking variances to warranty disclaimers because "all competing goods"
are "similarly limited").
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particular agreement since the terms are the same in the
agreement offered by a competing web site. So, the consumer
clicks away and hopes for the best. 8
This situation is quite different from the model contract
scenario that is assumed by contract doctrine. 79 Not only does
one party lack bargaining power with respect to a particular
transaction, but one class of parties lacks bargaining power
within a given market sector.8° The party's "assent" in such a
case is void of volition and merely reflects a failure on the part of
the consumer to resist market forces through self-deprivation.
Where the available "good" involves necessities such as credit or
insurance, this deprivation has very real social and economic
consequences. Similarly, given the ubiquity of software and
digital information, it is highly unlikely that even the most
ardent supporter of contractual autonomy would forego an ill-
advised "click" on the basis of principle and an understanding of
contract law alone. Instead, those of us who are aware of the
consequences of doing so click and cringe, and pray that
whatever we have agreed to is either benign, unlikely to be
enforced, or so horrible that it will be deemed unconscionable.
A refusal to accept standardized contractual terms is simply
unrealistic in many types of transactions. Refusing to purchase
software that is subject to the terms of a shrinkwrap agreement,
or clicking "I disagree" to electronic contracts containing
objectionable terms, is irrational and would force one to reject
78 See Scott J. Burnham, How to Read a Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 133 (2002)
(noting that consumers often click without reading); Hillman, supra note 50, at 743
(noting the "widely accepted fact that, for a number of reasons, consumers typically
do not read their standard forms").
79 Professor Arthur Leff discussed the difficulty with classifying consumer
transaction contracts as "contracts" in a classic article. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract
as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970). Professor Leff proposed treating "the
paper-with-words which accompanies the sale of a product" as "part of that
product," thereby inviting direct governmental regulation. Id. at 155.
80 Professor Addison Mueller noted two factors that together create the modern
consumer's lack of effective legal power:
First, there is an all-pervasive difficulty: our machinery of justice is simply
not designed for easy use by the average citizen with a minor claim of any
kind ....
... [Second,] he claims in contract and must use a deck of doctrine that
is stacked against him.
Most of his losing cards are colored "freedom of contract."
Mueller, supra note 30, at 578-79.
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many of the benefits of technological advancements. The claim
that such contracts are agreements reflective of free will is just
plain fiction.
On the other hand, allowing a consumer or putative licensee
to take advantage of the transaction and then reject the offered
terms also presents problems. The licensor is not obligated to
provide any products or services, and has a right to determine
how much risk it will assume in order to engage in business. The
calculation of that risk is often reflected in the contractual terms,
such as the licensor's limited warranty and limitation of liability.
The licensor may wish to offer the product, but only with some
restrictions on the licensee's use. The licensor continues to own
the intellectual property embodied in the software and likely
wishes to restrict how the licensee will use it. The readily
manipulable nature of digital information and the ease with
which the licensor's business objectives can be subverted makes
the licensor's desire for specific license terms or terms of use
understandable. Courts, sympathetic to the licensor's plight,
have tended to enforce licenses under contract law,8' finding
mutual assent provided there was a reasonable opportunity to
82review the terms. But, as discussed above, such an opportunity
is hollow if it provides no option for the consumer to negotiate
other than to decline to enter into the transaction altogether.
This does not mean that the licensor should bear the burden of
the consumer's refusal to read contractual terms; nor should it
mean, as it has in the past, that the consumer should bear the
burden of ferreting out onerous terms in a multipage contract
even if given the opportunity to do so. What it does mean is that
if the licensor wishes to impose certain onerous terms upon the
licensee, the licensor must receive the licensee's actual assent to
those terms. This shifts the burden onto the party in the best
position to bear it-the party with greater resources and greater
incentive to draft the contract.
81 It is perhaps unsurprising that, as Mark Lemley notes, "virtually all the courts
that have enforced browsewrap licenses have done so against a commercial entity,
generally one that competes with the drafter of the license." Lemley, Terms of Use,
supra note 7, at 462.
82 In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the Seventh Circuit did not even require review
of terms prior to purchase but merely an opportunity to return the purchased item
after review of the shrinkwrap license. 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996); see
also discussion infra Part II.
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Some may wonder, what difference does the requirement of
actual assent make if the consumer effectively has no choice
given the prevalence of onerous terms in standard form
contracts for similar products/services?. 3  The additional
transactional impediments required to manifest actual assent
slow down the contracting process, and that is an inconvenience
that affects both parties. The current accepted form of
nonnegotiated contracts now burdens only the consumer, and
offers no incentive to the licensor to offer streamlined
agreements or reasonable terms. 8 On the contrary, judicial
85deference to licensors' legitimate business concerns has
resulted in the licensors taking greedy advantage of consumers'
lack of power by imposing multipage terms that are accepted by
a simple click.
Robert Hillman has conducted an empirical study that
suggests that requiring advance disclosure of web site terms will
83 Korobkin, for example, states that notice of a provision does not necessarily
render it salient: "'Notice' is a prerequisite of salience, but notice is not a sufficient
condition of salience." Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1234.
84 See Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem
of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1637 (2006). But cf
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 472-75 (discussing how market forces may
discipline drafters of standard forms but conceding that it is "unclear how long
these factors will remain important").
85 Robert Oakley explains how license agreements evolved with technology:
Standard-form contracts became an issue in the consumer technology
context when computers evolved from being essentially a business
commodity . . . to being a consumer commodity . . . . In such an
environment, it was no longer possible to have a negotiated contract
between the seller and each and every customer. There was also
considerable uncertainty at the time about the scope of copyright
protection for computer software .... In an innovative experiment, and
with great uncertainty about their validity, these contracts began to take
the form of shrinkwrap licenses .... Over the years as the technology has
evolved, the licenses have evolved along with it to include so-called
clickwrap licenses. Browsewrap licenses were added as the Internet
developed with its ability to create hyperlinks that would take a customer
to a license agreement at another location.
Oakley, supra note 17, at 1048-49; see also Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note
32, at 341-53 (arguing that mass-market end user license agreements provide
substantial benefits for distributing information products, are efficient for mass
market distribution, informative for end users, and enable software publishers
commercial flexibility).
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86likely fail to increase consumers actually reading such terms.
He acknowledges that while requiring methods of attracting
attention, "such as requiring bold text or clicking after each term
on the screen (or both), might increase reading, ...analogous
strategies in the paper world have had mixed results, probably in
part because consumers, worn down by the contracting process,
are unlikely to be riveted to attention by such formalities. 8 7 Yet
Internet transactions are different from real world transactions
in significant ways. First, the real world consumer has expended
more effort in reaching a retail location. The consumer has
spent time and money on gas and parking. Searching for
alternative vendors also takes much more effort. In the same
way that price comparison shopping is much easier on the
Internet than running from shop to shop at the local mall, 8 so is
it easier to move from web site to web site, not necessarily in
order to review contract terms but to discover which web sites
offer a more pleasant experience. Web site marketers are very
aware of the benefits of making transactions as seamless as
possible. In the same way that a consumer is more likely to
return to a shopping site that processes transactions with "one
click," so too might that same consumer refuse to return to a site
that requires numerous clicks to approve onerous legal terms.89
My proposal contemplates a change, not just to the
substantive terms of licenses, but to the mechanism by which
assent may be demonstrated. Because it affects the consumer
experience, it is more likely to have an impact on consumer
loyalty. Standard form agreements thus become competitive
factors in more than a purely rhetorical sense. 90 To require
86 Hillman, supra note 24, at 840 ("[E]-consumers may still have ample rational
reasons for not reading and cognitive processes that deter reading and processing
terms.").
87 Id. at 844.
88 See Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Haggling 2.0, WALL ST. J., June 23-24, 2007, at P1
(reporting that "search engines and fashion sites listing retailer discount codes make
it easier than ever" for consumers to comparison shop and even bargain for better
prices on the Internet).
89 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass
Market Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 695-96 (2004) (setting
forth reasons why software publishers should care about better written end user
agreements, including building goodwill with customers).
90 To the claim that standard form contracts are unconscionable, it is often the
response that consumers are free to shop elsewhere for better terms. In reality,
consumers are unlikely to compare several different multipage agreements for
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multiple clicks burdens the consumers, but it also burdens the
licensor.9' The transactional hurdles would likely result in real
costs to the licensor in terms of aborted transactions and timed-
out web exchanges, thus providing an incentive to the licensor to
rethink its contractual offerings. 92
While limiting presumed assent to license grant or scope of
use provisions may be simple in theory, many licensors may
simply attempt to cram more terms and conditions in paragraphs
captioned "License Grant" or "Scope of Use." Implementing
the proposed approach thus requires that the operative effect of
the provision-rather than its caption-determines whether
actual or presumed assent is required. Generally, terms that
restrict the licensee's use of the intellectual property would
require only presumed assent. The terms of use would then be
enforceable provided that traditional contract defenses did not
apply. In other words, lack of actual assent to license grant
provisions or terms of use would not prevent contract formation
even though traditional contract law defenses may still bar
enforcement of those terms. On the other hand, terms unrelated
to use of the software or web site that (i) impose an affirmative
obligation on the licensee or (ii) require the licensee to
relinquish otherwise existent rights would require actual assent.
These two categories of terms are discussed below.
1. Affirmative Obligation Provisions
If the relevant contractual term imposes an affirmative
obligation that is not directly related to the use of the licensor's
intellectual property, the licensor should be required to show
that the licensee actually assented to that particular term. Let us
return to the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this
Article where you wish to download software from YOUCH's
web site. In order to start the download process, you must
reasons exhaustively discussed elsewhere. See Eisenberg, supra note 74; Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 445-54; Korobkin, supra note 12; Meyerson, supra
note 52; Slawson, supra note 12.
91 Hillman, supra note 24, at 844.
92 Korobkin claims that "negative reputational consequences of inefficient non-
salient form terms are unlikely to discipline sellers to offer efficient terms."
Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1240; see also id. at 1246-48. While this may be true in
certain real-world transactions, this is less likely to be true where the negative
reputational consequence is combined with annoying transactional obstacles.
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accept the terms of an electronic contract. You have clicked on
the "I accept" button but have not read the terms of the
contract. Your clicking expressed your assent to enter into the
transaction, but not your actual assent to the individual
contractual terms. Is the provision prohibiting you from deleting
those pesky desktop icons enforceable? Under the blanket
assent theory of consent, because you have manifested assent to
the transaction, it is likely that the provision would be held
enforceable unless it were unconscionable. An
unconscionability analysis would examine whether that term was
unreasonably favorable to YOUCH, and whether you had a"meaningful choice" regarding whether or not to enter into the
transaction. Let us pretend that the software is being provided
to users at no charge. Using this test for unconscionability, there
is a strong possibility that the provisions would be upheld. You
are not required to download the optional software and you are
free to join other networking sites that do not have this
requirement. The term, while favorable to YOUCH, is not
unreasonable especially if the software is being provided at no
charge.
The clause whereby you unwittingly consented to advertise
YOUCH's singles matching services, while surprising to you, is
not particularly oppressive or shocking, particularly since you
are free to go elsewhere and had an opportunity to review the
terms of the agreement prior to acceptance. In fact, many
YOUCH members might be delighted by the prospect of greater
distribution which increases their odds of finding a suitable
match. Yet the result is wrong. One could argue that the
provision in question is contrary to industry norms and defeats
the "reasonable expectations" of the parties.93 Yet, what are the
93 The Restatement, for example, states that "where the other party has reason to
believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979). An accompanying
comment adds that "(a)lthough customers typically adhere to standardized
agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard
terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range
of reasonable expectations." Id. cmt. f. Generally, the reasonable expectations
doctrine has been limited to contracts for insurance coverage. See Kenneth S.
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (noting that "a principle
authorizing the courts to honor the 'reasonable expectations' of the insured is
emerging. This 'expectations principle' is used to justify a wide range of decisions
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reasonable expectations of the parties with respect to a practice
that is novel, i.e., the use of software in exchange for permission
to use the customer in advertising? The argument regarding
reasonable expectations and industry norms carries some weight
only as long as the practice is novel. If other companies
determine that this method is an effective marketing tool, then it
could quickly become an industry norm, as one-sided as this
norm may be.94 An establishment of an industry norm would
then defeat any claims of subsequent consumers that the
provision was an unfair surprise, or defeated their reasonable
expectations.
Under my proposed approach, your assent to the terms of the
contract can be presumed with respect to those terms that
restrict the way that you use YOUCH's software and/or its web
site. Your assent would not be presumed, however, with respect
to terms that impose an affirmative obligation not directly
related to your use of YOUCH's web site, nor would your assent
be presumed with respect to any provisions that deprive you of a
legal right (i.e., your right to privacy and your right to control
the use of your personal information). Terms that impose
affirmative obligations would require express consent. In our
hypothetical, your assent to the license grant, but not to the
other terms, would be presumed. Your failure to read the
provisions of the contract would not prevent contract formation,
but it would affect whether a particular provision becomes a
binding part of that contract. This does not, however, mean that
YOUCH would never be able to enforce a contract containing
an agreement on the part of the licensee to participate in
advertising campaigns. In order for such a provision to be
enforceable, YOUCH would need the licensee's express
consent. YOUCH could obtain such consent, for example, by
requiring the consumer to "initial" the marketing provision-
this could take the form of an electronic click immediately
following the provision.
granting policyholders coverage in spite of policy language that seems to deny it.")
Id. at 1151-52.
94 Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1271 (noting that "if reasonable expectations are
defined by prevailing custom . . .the doctrine could entrench and perpetuate
inefficient low-quality terms that become commonplace because they are non-
salient to most buyers").
[Vol. 86, 797
Clicking and Cringing
It would be more complicated to obtain actual assent to a
term in a shrinkwrap agreement that does not pertain to the
scope of the license-and it should be. The licensor should not
be able to foist obligations not directly related to the scope of
the license upon the licensee without the licensee's actual
consent. Thus, provisions contained in shrinkwrap agreements
that do not pertain to how the licensee may use the software
(i.e., provisions that do not derive or flow from the grant of
rights by the licensor) would be per se unenforceable unless the
consumer was asked to initial such terms at the time of
purchase-in the same way that consumers currently are asked
to initial individual provisions of car rental agreements or other
important, but not intuitive, provisions in other types of form
agreements. This requirement of actual assent would shift the
burden that currently exists on the consumer to sift out the
onerous provisions onto the party better situated to do so-the
contract drafter. The licensor as the drafting party is in a better
position to point out the material terms and draw them to the
licensee's attention. This may slow down the transaction, but the
result would burden both parties whereas currently, the burden
of nonnegotiated contracts is borne only by the consumer.
Shifting the burden of affirmative obligation provisions from
the consumer/putative licensee to the contract drafter
accomplishes two important objectives. First, it encourages
economic efficiency in transactions by eliminating free-rider
provisions. Such provisions are included in nonnegotiated
contracts even though their presence or absence would not affect
either party's decision to enter into the transaction. Often their
inclusion in contracts reflects a surfeit of caution, an obsessive
desire for no-additional-cost complete legal coverage, or simply
reflects boilerplate carried over from a prior form agreement.
Those provisions that are not free riders, on the other hand, will
be called to the reader's attention and will remain in the
contract. Contract drafters faced with the requirement of calling
out affirmative obligation provisions will either modify their
contracts if the provision is considered important enough (i.e., if
it is part of what is being bargained for), or they will drop the
provision as unnecessary, thus streamlining and facilitating the
contracting process. Consumers, too, will gain from this
requirement. Currently, the overwhelming verbiage presented
in form agreements makes it difficult to distinguish innocuous
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provisions from those requiring more scrutiny and
contemplation. A requirement of manifestation of consent to
an affirmative obligation term attracts the consumer's attention
and requires the consumer to consider whether the proposed
transaction in fact is what she or he had bargained for. If the
answer is yes, the consumer will proceed to click "I agree." If
the answer is no, he or she will click "I do not agree." The
consumer faced with such a decision may not be enthusiastic
about the available options, but at least he or she is made aware
of the consequences of engaging in the transaction. The act of
assenting forces the consumer to acknowledge the existence of a
particular term. The affirmative obligation provision then
becomes part of what is bargained for, and is weighed in the
consumer's cost-benefit calculation. The resulting agreement
thus more accurately reflects what both parties wanted and
encourages the efficiency of the transaction. Currently the
assumption under contract law is that all provisions in a contract
reflect the bargain. This assumption does not reflect the reality
where nonnegotiated contracts are involved. A consumer may
want a particular good or service, but not the ancillary provisions
that he or she may not have bothered to read. This does not
mean that the consumer should be permitted to set the terms of
the bargain nor that a consumer should be allowed to pick and
choose the provisions at his or her sole discretion. What it does
mean is that the contract drafter should not be able to get more
than what he or she bargained for.
Second, a requirement of actual assent to terms that impose
an affirmative obligation upon the consumer provides an
incentive to the contract drafter to streamline the contracting96
process. The licensor risks losing business or harming its
95 Richard Epstein, on the other hand, argues that those who are less
knowledgeable are able to "rely, often to free-ride, on the wisdom of their betters to
achieve the terms that make for successful contracting." Epstein, supra note 10, at
206. But as Clayton Gillette points out, in many cases, there are divergent interests
among buyers. See Gillette, supra note 52, at 250-53; see also Meyerson, supra note
52, at 1270-71 (expressing skepticism that there exists a "small cadre of type-A
consumers" that ferrets out beneficial terms to the benefit of the nonreading
majority of consumers).
96 There is some evidence that streamlining contractual terms promotes
consumer reading and understanding. See Davis, supra note 48. Davis conducted
an empirical study examining the impact of simplified disclosure terms in consumer
credit agreements. He concludes that "[r]equired disclosure undoubtedly can play
an important role in protecting consumers. But to be useful, important information
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reputation by putting forth onerous terms that will require the
putative licensee's acknowledgement and active consent.97 The
Internet itself may facilitate consumer action." Consumers can
easily send unhappy e-mails to licensors. Individuals can share
and disseminate information by posting comments in blogs and
consumer-oriented web sites ridiculing onerous clickwrap
terms.99 Such a requirement forces both parties to consider the
importance of such terms in the context of the transaction as a
whole; more importantly, it forces each party to acknowledge
that the other party recognizes and accepts the importance of
such term. For the putative licensee, it indicates that the
particular term is not just harmless boilerplate that will never be
implemented or enforced by the licensor. Minimal, and in the
case of browsewraps, nonexistent, transactional obstacles
encourage and facilitate consumer ignorance. A requirement of
actual assent makes it harder for a consumer to play ostrich.
The repeated indignity of forced assent to unreasonable terms
may, in turn, result in collective action by consumers. Even if it
does not, heightened awareness of a party to a contract is in and
of itself socially beneficial.'0 Furthermore, such a requirement
must be available in documents free of needless clutter." Id. at 906. He adds that
consumer-credit contracts should contain "only those clauses essential to the buyer-
seller relationship." Id.
97 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 470 (noting that the "intense focus
on reputation created by the e-business environment diminishes the likelihood that
e-businesses will offer inefficient terms in their standard forms"). The authors
caution that because of the availability of information on the Internet, "e-businesses
must be careful about the content of their boilerplate, or at least might refrain from
enforcing some of it." Id.
98 Id. at 471 (observing that the availability of "Internet research will have a
greater effect on e-businesses than on conventional businesses").
99 Some web sites have responded to such complaints by modifying their license
terms. For example, Fark.com recently revised its terms of use after users
complained about the terms on BoingBoing, another web site. See Cory Doctorow,
Fark's Copyright Policy Stinks-UPDATED, BOINGBOING, Apr. 26, 2007,
http://www.boingboing.net/2007/04/26/farks-copyright-poli.html. Thanks to Fred
von Lohmann for posting about this issue to the cyberprof listserv. MySpace
changed its terms and conditions to expressly permit members to retain proprietary
rights to their posted materials after member complaints. See Billy Bragg, Op-Ed.,
The Royalty Scam, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2008. CD Baby recently overhauled its
clickwrap agreement, apparently in response to complaints from potential users
about the overwhelming legalese. E-mail from Derek Sivers, CD Baby, Hostbaby,
to Seth Burns (Mar. 15, 2006, 07:46 PST) (on file with author).
10 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 441-42 (stating that "[c]onsumers
concerned about the possibility of exploitation can try to avoid terms they consider
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reallocates the current balance of burdens away from the
consumer to the party in the better position to accommodate it.
2. Provisions That Take Away Legal Rights
Contractual provisions that diminish the consumer's legal
rights should also be subject to the standard of actual assent. 10
1
Because such rights exist independently from the consumer's
right to use the software or other licensed product, the licensee
cannot be presumed to have relinquished them.'0° I use the term"rights" loosely here to include privileges otherwise available to
the licensee that do not derive from or arise out of the license
grant. 103 Examples of provisions restricting or diminishing rights
include those compelling arbitration in the event of a dispute
and provisions limiting the choice of forum. Currently, such
provisions are standard in many nonnegotiated software
licenses.'0 4 There are a number of explanations offered for why
and how these provisions originated. Many commentators state
that such provisions are essential to the drafting party. For
example, some scholars argue that the provision eliminating the
licensee's right of first sale under the Copyright Act is necessary
exploitative and refuse to transact with businesses that have reputations for offering
and enforcing manipulative contract terms." Additionally, "the aggregate decisions
of many consumers can pressure businesses into providing an efficient set of
contract terms in their standard forms.") (emphasis added).
101 See Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 5, at 1264 (stating that as a
matter of policy "unbargained shrinkwrap license provisions that reduce or
eliminate the rights granted to licensees by the federal intellectual property law"
should not be enforced).
102 Korobkin provides additional support for why such provisions should require
actual assent:
If buyers believe that personal safety or the right to seek redress of legal
wrongs in a court of law are entitlements that should be inalienable and not
subject to commodification, explicitly trading off these types of
entitlements against a product's price and physical features might create
elevated stress levels.
Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1231. He notes that buyers often cope with the stress of
emotion-laden choices by ignoring such terms and rendering them nonsalient. Id. at
1231-32.
103 But see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913) (distinguishing "rights"
from "privileges").
104 Judith Resnik has noted that increasingly alternative dispute resolution
dominates (and supplants) the adjudicatory process. See generally Judith Resnik,
Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 619-21 (2005).
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to protect the licensor's intellectual property rights.'05 While
many critics have questioned the validity of such arguments on
substantive grounds,'06 the focus of this Article is on the process
by which such provisions are incorporated into agreements. A
consumer may be unaware that he or she has abdicated certain
rights or privileges by entering into the transaction.1 08  Even if
such provisions are not contrary to public policy or otherwise
105 See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 32, at 352-61 (stating that
software publishers restrict rights associated with first sale, such as decompilation,
reverse engineering, and disassembly, because they risk exposing the secrets
contained in the software's source code); Mark I. Koffsky, Note, Patent Preemption
of Computer Software Contracts Restricting Reverse Engineering: The Last Stand?,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1160-61 (1999) (claiming that contracts-that restrict
reverse engineering may become the "primary method" for software creators to
deter such activity). The recent enactment of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act
of 1998 ("DMCA") is likely to alleviate such concerns. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Section 1201 of
the DMCA proscribes devices that are primarily designed to circumvent
technological devices intended to protect against unauthorized copying. 17 U.S.C. §
1201 (2006); see also Madison, supra note 72, at 287-90 (discussing how the
anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA operates as a form of licensing to
restrict users' rights); Peter Moore, Note, Steal This Disk: Copy Protection,
Consumers' Rights, and the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1437, 1440-42, 1445-48 (2003) (arguing that the first sale doctrine and archival use
are in danger of becoming moot due to the DMCA).
106 See, e.g., Hemnes, supra note 61, at 577-81 (discussing historical reasons why
software is licensed). Hemnes concludes that although "[o]riginally justified by the
necessity of protecting software as a trade secret, software licensing now appears to
be both unnecessary ... and inconsistent with the general right of alienation that
appears in the common law, the Copyright Act, patent law, the Bankruptcy Code
and the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 599; see also Madison, supra note 72, at
281-82, 289 (discussing how first sale rights are restricted by software licenses and
the DMCA).
107 See Kim, Licensing Dilemma, supra note 62 (discussing the legal and policy
related problems with characterizing a software transaction as a "license" instead of
a "sale").
108 As Friedrich Kessler noted:
[F]reedom of contract does not commend itself for moral reasons only; it is
also an eminently practical principle. It is the inevitable counterpart of a
free enterprise system. ...
The development of large scale enterprise with its mass production and
mass distribution made a new type of contract inevitable-the standardized
mass contract.... The individuality of the parties which so frequently gave
color to the old type contract has disappeared. The stereotyped contract of
today reflects the impersonality of the market.
Kessler, supra note 11, at 630-31.
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invalid,'0 9 agreement to their terms should not be presumed but
actively sought." ° Nonnegotiated standard form contracts, by
their very nature, assume passive acceptance by the consumer.
While there are numerous arguments in favor of such contracts,
acceptance of their form should not mean wholesale acceptance
of their terms. A requirement of actual assent would merely
shift the current presumption-a presumption that favors the
party in control of the structure of the transaction. Instead of
presuming acceptance, as is currently the case, the presumption
would be that such terms are not part of the transaction. The
burden would thus be on the contract drafter to prove
acceptance of these particular terms by the consumer. The
terms could still be offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis;
however, it would require a little more effort on the part of the
contract drafter, and a lot more willful blindness on the part of
the consumer, to do so.
3. Using U. C. C. Article 2 as Default Terms
Much disagreement exists regarding whether software is a
good or service and whether it is or should be licensed or sold.
Consequently, it is unclear whether the U.C.C. governs software
transactions."' I advocate looking to the U.C.C. as a source of
109 While many critics have questioned the legitimacy and validity of such claims
on substantive grounds, the focus of this Article is on the validity of the process by
which such provisions are incorporated into contracts.
110 Resnik notes that "[aispects of privately-based dispute resolution are now
melded with public processes as the state itself embraces private dispute resolution
for a wide array of conflicts brought to its courts and puts judges in the job of trying
to resolve disputes through contracts." Resnik, supra note 104, at 622-23. The
enhanced likelihood that a judge will defer to contractual terms in determining
procedural matters only highlights the necessity of ensuring that there was actual
consent to those contractual terms. Resnik proposes that "[in light of the legal
ability to use settlement contracts as vehicles to generate court enforcement, courts
should refuse to sanction certain kinds of bargains." Id. at 599. Examples of such
bargains include "most favored nations' clauses," and limitations of parties' capacity
to bargain for sealed records. Id. at 650.
111 See Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Nimmer,
supra note 60; see also Kim, Licensing Dilemma, supra, note 62. In most
transactions with consumers, there is a sale of the medium (i.e. the CD) upon which
the software or other digital information is loaded, but retention of intellectual
property ownership by the licensor to the underlying program. See Madison, supra
note 72, at 297-99; Nimmer, supra note 60, at 942 (referring to licenses and leases as
conditional transactions where the primary feature is that one "party retains the
right in law to control the other party's use of the information in various ways, while
the other party receives only limited privileges or rights in the information").
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guiding principles with respect to consumer transactions,
regardless of whether software is licensed or sold, or categorized
as goods or services, or something else." 2
Any gaps in the contract created by the nonenforcement of
terms requiring actual assent should be filled using the U.C.C.
Article 2 governing the sale of goods with two notable
exceptions. My proposal precludes-indeed supplants-U.C.C.
section 2-207. 13 In addition, U.C.C. section 1-205 would not be
applicable. That section provides as follows:
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope
of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is establishedthat such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar
writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
(3) ... [A]ny usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which
(the parties) are engaged or of which they are or should be
aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify
terms of an agreement. 114
Nimmer contends that software is not a "good" and therefore should not be
governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. at all. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in
the Contemporary Information Economy, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 113 (2002)
(stating that "[t]he software and digital information industries do not deal in goods
any more than the motion picture industry deals in celluloid tapes.") Nimmer
promotes UCITA as "a separate body of contract law applicable to transactions in
computer information." Id. at 116. The issue of whether software is a "good," a"service," or something else entirely, while an important one, is not to be resolved
in this Article.
112 See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 73
(8th ed. 2006) ("[I1t should be borne in mind that even where a UCC provision is
not directly applicable to a transaction-for example, where the provision is in
Article 2 and the transaction involves services-the principle embodied in the
provision may be applicable, so that the provision may serve as a source of law.");
see also Daniel E. Murray, Under The Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 448 (1971) (describing
American courts as "almost zealous in extending the reach of Article 2 to non-sales
areas").
113 As Epstein points out, section 2-207 is "an unfit model to carry over to the
licenses of software and computer information technology, whether or not these are
covered under the sale of goods provisions of the UCC." See Epstein, supra note
10, at 216.
114 U.C.C. § 1-205 (2000). The corresponding section in the 2007 version of the
U.C.C. states that "usage of trade ... is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the
parties' agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the agreement,
and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement." U.C.C. § 1-303(d)
(2007).
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In an industry governed by contracts of adhesion, the creation
of industry "standards" does not reflect mutually agreed terms.
This does not mean that such terms would never be included as
part of a contract; it does, however, mean that in order to so
include them, actual-and not presumed-assent would be
required.
II
MAKING SENSE OF NONNEGOTIATED SOFTWARE LICENSES
This Section applies my proposed approach in two different
ways. Part A analyzes the current case law addressing issues
raised by nonnegotiated licenses and discusses how the disparate
court opinions may be reconciled under the approach set forth in
Part I. Part B examines a sample software license agreement
and reviews how typical contract provisions might fare using the
proposed approach.
A. An Overview of the Law Governing Nonnegotiated Licenses
Software licenses are usually categorized as negotiated or
nonnegotiated. Nonnegotiated agreements typically include
shrinkwrap, browsewrap, and clickwrap licenses. The form of
these licenses evolved to accommodate the form of the product
that was being licensed and the perceived need for protection.
As technology enabled different venues or applications, the form
of the licenses adapted to these changes."5  This section
examines the current law pertaining to each of these types of
licenses. 116
1. Shrinkwrap Licenses
Does a customer enter into a contract when he or she unwraps
a software package? The first courts to address the issue of
shrinkwrap agreements'17 concluded in the negative. In Step-
115 See Oakley, supra note 17, at 1048-54.
116 This section offers only a cursory overview of the law governing shrinkwraps,
clickwraps, and browsewraps because this territory has been well trod by other
scholars. See, e.g., Michael H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes in Cyberspace Under E-
Sign: "There's a New Sheriff in Town!", 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 943, 949-91 (2002);
Joo, supra note 75; Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 5.
117 A shrinkwrap license is an example of a "rolling contract." In a rolling
contract situation, the customer orders and pays for the goods before having an
[Vol. 86, 797
Clicking and Cringing
Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, the Third Circuit
held that a "box-top" license was invalid under the U.C.C."
18
The Court determined that the contract for the sale of the
software product was made when the product was purchased;
therefore, any terms contained in the shrinkwrap were merely
unaccepted "proposals for modification" under U.C.C. Section
2-207 and not a conditional acceptance by the software
producer."9 In other words, the consumer never assented to the
terms of the shrinkwrap agreement. The Fifth Circuit in Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd. stated that a shrinkwrap license
was unenforceable because it touched upon federal copyright
law and was therefore preempted. 120
In 1996, however, the Seventh Circuit, in the landmark case of
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, concluded that "[s]hrinkwrap licenses
are enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds
applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a
rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable)., 12' The
plaintiff, ProCD, compiled information from over 3000
telephone directories into a computer database. 122  It sold a
version of the database, called SelectPhone, on compact discs. 123
The plaintiff claimed that the database cost more than ten
million dollars to compile and additional resources to
maintain. 124 ProCD sold its database to the general public for
personal use at a significantly lower price than it did to• 125
manufacturers and retailers. The court discussed ProCD's
price discrimination policy and the financial benefits to126
consumers. It stated that rather than tailoring the product to
opportunity to review the contract terms, which are included with the product. See
Hillman, supra note 50, at 744.
118 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
119 Id. at 98, 102-03.
120 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
121 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
122 The court assumed that the database could not be copyrighted. Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 The court stated:
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a
single price-that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users than
to the general public-it would have to raise the price substantially over
$150 [the retail price for the general public]. The ensuing reduction in sales
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suit a particular user, 27 ProCD decided to contractually bind its
customers to its price discrimination policy. 12" The outside of
each box stated that the software was subject to enclosed license
terms. The license, which limited use of the program to
noncommercial purposes, was contained in the user's manual. 129
The defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, purchased a consumer
package of SelectPhone and formed a company to resell the
information contained in the database on the Internet for a price
that was less than what ProCD charged its commercial130
customers. Zeidenberg argued that ProCD made an offer by
placing the software in stores.1 3' He stated, and the district court
agreed, that he "accepted" the offer by purchasing thee. 132
software. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating that "ProCD
proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the
software after having an opportunity to read the license at
would harm consumers who value the information at, say, $200. They get
consumer surplus of $50 under the current arrangement but would cease to
buy if the price rose substantially. If because of high elasticity of demand
in the consumer segment of the market the only way to make a profit
turned out to be a price attractive to commercial users alone, then all
consumers would lose out-and so would the commercial clients, who
would have to pay more for the listings because ProCD could not obtain
any contribution toward costs from the consumer market.
Id.
127 The court hinted that modifying the product might be more cumbersome than
contractual enforcement:
To make price discrimination work ... the seller must be able to control
arbitrage. . . .Vendors of computer software have a harder task [than
airline carriers or movie producers]. Anyone can walk into a retail store
and buy a box ..... [E]ven a commercial-user-detector at the door would
not work, because a consumer could buy the software and resell to a
commercial user. That arbitrage would break down the price
discrimination and drive up the minimum price at which ProCD would sell
to anyone.
Instead of tinkering with the product and letting users sort themselves-
for example, furnishing current data at a high price that would be attractive
only to commercial customers, and two-year-old data at a low price-
ProCD turned to the institution of contract.
Id. at 1450.
128 Id.
129 It also appeared on the user's screen every time the software was run. Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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leisure."'' 33 It further noted that while contracts are often formed
simply by paying for a product and walking out of the store, the
U.C.C. permits contracts to be formed in other ways. 134 Since
ProCD, courts have generally upheld the enforceability of
shrinkwrap licenses.13
5
As many scholars have noted, the ProCD court's analysis of
the U.C.C. leaves much to be desired. 136 U.C.C. section 2-204(1)
states, "A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any
manner sufficient to show agreement, including ... conduct by
both parties which recognizes the existence of [such] . . . a
contract. 1 37  Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, turned
this provision on its head so that the parties' conduct no longer
established the existence of the agreement. According to
Easterbrook, the written contract assigned meaning to the
conduct rather than the other way around. Under this analysis,
the placement of software on a store shelf would not constitute
an offer to sell that a consumer could accept by payment and
dominion over the software copy (as the defendant had argued)
nor, alternatively, would the consumer's payment for the
software constitute an offer that the store would accept by taking
payment (as typically understood under traditional contract
133 Id. at 1452.
134 Id.
135 See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Adobe
Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Peerless
Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519 (W.D. Pa.
2000). While a minority of courts has refused to enforce shrinkwrap licenses even
after ProCD, these cases lack a consistent rationale and are distinguishable on their
facts. For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas held in a recent opinion that a
shrinkwrap agreement submitted after the buyer had accepted the seller's proposal
was a request for modification. See Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc.,
144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006). The Wachter court distinguished ProCD and Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1987), because those cases involved
nonnegotiated consumer contracts. See also Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding the U.C.C. applicable to the sale of computers).
136 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 7, at 468-69 (noting that the ProCD
court's legal reasoning is "certainly questionable"); see also Post, supra note 42, at
1226 (stating that Judge Easterbrook ignored U.C.C. sections 2-207 and 2-206, the
commentary to these sections, the existing precedent interpreting the statute, and
the commentary of scholars and experts on Article 2).
137 U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2003).
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law). 38 Instead, under Easterbrook's view, the meaning assigned
to the buyer's conduct would be determined by the agreement
contained within the software box. Thus, if the terms within the
box stated that the buyer agrees to pay a fifty dollar monthly
maintenance fee, then the buyer's purchase and dominion of the
software would indicate assent to that term even though the
buyer did not know about the term until after completing the
conduct which purports to establish such assent. Perhaps most
notably, the ProCD court held that Zeidenberg demonstrated
assent to the shrinkwrap license terms by retaining and using the
software even though a consumer could be expected to undertake
these actions for reasons other than to demonstrate assent.139 But
as Corbin stated:
[A]n offeror can not, merely by saying that the offeree's
silence will be taken as an acceptance, cause it to be operative
as such.... It is substantially the same case as where an offeror
attempts to give the meaning of an acceptance to some other
ordinary act of the offeree that the latter wishes to do without
giving it such a meaning. If A offers his land to B for a price,
saying that B may signify his acceptance by eating his breakfast
or by hanging out his flag on Washington's birthday or by
attending church on Sunday, he does not thereby make such
action by B operative as an acceptance against B's will. 140
Under the court's analysis in ProCD, assent to the terms of a
shrinkwrap license is presumed and the burden is placed upon
the consumer to disaffirm assent. In other words, Easterbrook's
analysis places an affirmative obligation upon the consumer to
establish nonconsent to the terms of the shrinkwrap
agreement-something which is anathema to contract law, which
has long maintained that silence, or inaction, should not
constitute acceptance.141 Zeidenberg's failure to object to the
terms of the shrinkwrap agreement-which can only be
138 See Post, supra note 42, at 1226 (stating that "as most first year law students
can tell you, a display of merchandise in a store window, and one supposes on a
shelf, is nothing more than an 'invitation to offer."').
139 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453; Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 7, at 468
(noting that "the specified conduct that indicates acceptance is the opening of a
package and the loading of software the consumer has already paid for-precisely
the conduct one would expect the user to engage in if she had been unaware of the
shrinkwrap license.").
140 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 73, at 310.
141 Id. §§ 71-72, at 298-309; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
69 (1979).
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expressed by taking affirmative steps to return the software-is
thus construed as assent, even where such failure can be
attributable to other causes, such as ignorance or logistical
constraints.142
An alternative, and better, contract law analysis of the
transaction in ProCD would be that the terms of the shrinkwrap
agreement do not govern the sales transaction, which is complete
at the time the consumer makes payment and such payment is
accepted by the store. The consumer does not and logically
cannot assent to these terms prior to the completion of the sales
transaction. The terms fail as modifications to the sales
transaction because they are not supported by consideration nor
is the consumer compelled to accept any such attempted
modifications. This does not mean that the terms of the
shrinkwrap agreement are without any role or effect. The terms
of the scope of license or terms of use provide the consumer with
notice of the software producer's business policies and the
conditions upon which the software is being provided. The
absence of the consumer's express consent does not mean that
those terms do not nonetheless govern the relationship. The
consumer's act of accepting the offer to sell the software (or,
more accurately, the consumer's offer to purchase the software
which is then accepted by acceptance of payment) does not then
give the consumer the right to establish the scope of the license
grant.14 3 While the consumer's purchase of the software does not
thereby demonstrate actual assent to all the shrinkwrap terms,
assent to the scope of license terms can be presumed because the
licensor has the power to establish the terms upon which the
software shall be provided. The licensor's intellectual property
ownership of the software code entitles it to establish the
parameters of the license grant that it wishes to provide to
licensees provided that it does not trammel on the licensee's
unrelinquished preexisting rights or impose affirmative
responsibilities unrelated to how the software is used. In other
words, while the licensor does not have the right to force the
licensee to undertake affirmative acts or to relinquish legal
142 See Rolling, supra note 40, at 226 (noting that consumers are subject to retail
store policies, and that those who live in rural areas may find it costly and time
consuming to drive to retail outlets or to return ship mail-ordered products).
143 For a discussion of the role of normative assumptions in contract law, see
generally Joo, supra note 75.
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rights, the licensee should not have the right to provide the terms
by which the licensor chooses to conduct its business. T4
2. Clickwrap Licenses
ProCD addressed the enforceability of a shrinkwrap license
that accompanies the purchase of software contained in a box.
In many cases, however, software is distributed over the Internet
pursuant to the terms of a clickwrap agreement. In some ways,
clickwrap agreements are less problematic than shrinkwrap
agreements for the simple reason that a user expressly manifests
assent by clicking. 14  Generally, clickwrap agreements do not
permit a user to progress until and unless the user clicks on a box
containing the words "I agree" or some similar expression of
agreement. Often, the user is asked to acknowledge the terms of
a clickwrap agreement by clicking more than once. But not all
clickwrap agreements are alike. While some agreements display
all their provisions on a single computer page, many clickwrap
agreements appear in small textboxes that require constant
scrolling in order to review their terms. Sometimes, the "assent"
button does not appear within the text box but is readily
apparent alongside it on the screen. This cumbersome and
aggravating method of providing clickwrap terms, while
facilitating the user's ability to express assent, seems specifically
designed to encourage users to simply click on the "I agree"
button without reading the terms.' 46
Clickwrap agreements do not raise the same contract
formation concerns as shrinkwrap agreements because the user
144 See Nimmer, supra note 60, at 950 (critiquing opponents of standard form
contracts who take a "result-oriented" position that favors buyers and holds that
"the transferee should be entitled to receive a transfer including specific terms,
regardless of the terms sought by the other party").
145 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use
Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 548 (2003).
146 See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Software License Agreement, http://sunsolve.sun
.com/show.do?target=patches/patch-license&nav=pub-patches (last visited Mar. 18,
2008). Several courts have made this observation as well. See, e.g., Scarcella v.
AOL, No. 1168/04, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1578, at *2-3 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 8,
2004) (noting that the presentation of the agreement made it easy to skip reading
the terms: "Defendant considerately makes it very easy to avoid going to the
trouble of slogging through all of that text. The customer can bypass all that bother
by simply pressing the 'OK, I Agree' button. If the customer nonetheless bites the
bullet and presses the 'Read Now' button, Defendant affords him or her a second
opportunity to skip over what will become the contract between the parties .... ).
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typically has notice of the terms and has an opportunity to read
them prior to engaging in the contractual relationship. A user is
also not required to take onerous affirmative steps to disaffirm
the contract by, for example, returning the merchandise; a
simple click on "I DO NOT ACCEPT" will do.147 Courts have
refused to uphold clickwrap agreements if users do not have
sufficient notice of their terms, or do not have to affirmatively
accept the terms of use. 148 This does not mean that clickwrap
agreements do not raise any contractual issues at all. In
particular, many commentators find their "take-it-or-leave-it"
nature troubling. They are not, however, inherently more
troubling than other contracts of adhesion simply because their
terms are digital rather than inscribed on paper.149
One of the first cases to address the issue of clickwrap
agreements, CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, involved a forum
selection clause.5 The defendant, Patterson, was a resident of
Houston, Texas, who claimed never to have visited Ohio.15' The
plaintiff was CompuServe, a computer information service
headquartered in Columbus, Ohio."2  Patterson subscribed to
CompuServe's computing and information services via the
Internet and placed certain computer software products as"shareware" on the CompuServe system for others to use and
purchase." 3 When Patterson became a shareware provider, he
entered into a "Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA")
with CompuServe." Pursuant to the SRA, CompuServe
provided its subscribers access to the shareware that Patterson
created as an independent contractor. 5 The SRA incorporated
147 See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Caspi v.
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
148 See Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing
to enforce an arbitration clause contained in a license agreement that was not
readily apparent to user downloading software); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F.
Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (refusing to enforce an online license agreement
because the link to it was not sufficiently obvious).
149 For a comprehensive analysis and comparison of paper-based and electronic-
based standard form contracts, see Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28.
150 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
151 Id. at 1260.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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by reference two other documents, the CompuServe Service
Agreement ("Service Agreement") and the Rules of
Operation. 156 Both the SRA and the Service Agreement stated
that they were entered into in Ohio.l5 7 The Service Agreement
further provided that its terms were "'governed by and
construed in accordance with' Ohio law., 158 The court noted
that the SRA required Patterson to type "AGREE" at various
points in the document "[i]n recognition of [his] on line [sic]
agreement to all the above terms and conditions., 159 Patterson
marketed his software for several years on CompuServe's
system. 160 CompuServe later began to market a similar software
product, which gave rise to Patterson's allegations of trademark
infringement. CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment in the
federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio, relying
on the court's diversity subject matter jurisdiction.162 Patterson
filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, including lack of
personal jurisdiction. 163 The district court granted Patterson's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.164
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
Patterson's contacts with Ohio were sufficient to support the
district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.165 The Sixth
Circuit referred to the Internet as representing "perhaps the
latest and greatest manifestation of... historical globe-shrinking
trends."' 66 The court assumed the enforceability of the clickwrap
agreement, noting that Patterson "entered into a written
contract with CompuServe which provided for the application of
Ohio law," and stated that he "then purposefully perpetuated
the relationship with CompuServe via repeated communications
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1260-61.
160 Id. at 1261.
161 Id.
162 Id. CompuServe sought a declaration that it had not infringed any common
law trademarks of Patterson's, or of Patterson's company, FlashPoint Development,
and that it was not otherwise guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practice. Id.
163 Id.
164 ld.
165 Id. at 1262-68.
166 Id. at 1262.
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with its system in Ohio.' ' 167 The court emphasized that Patterson
was "far more than a purchaser of services; he was a third-party
provider of software who used CompuServe, which is located in
Columbus, to market his wares in Ohio and elsewhere.' ' 168 The
court stated that while "merely entering into a contract with
CompuServe would not, without more, establish that Patterson
had minimum contacts with Ohio," that act in conjunction with
Patterson's placement of his software product into the stream of
commerce and other factors established sufficient contact to
169establish jurisdiction. Patterson manifested actual assent to
the SRA first at his computer in Texas, which was then
transmitted to CompuServe in Ohio. 17 0
In Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L. L. C., the Superior Court of
New Jersey upheld a forum selection clause in a clickwrap
agreement. 171 Caspi involved a class action complaint against
Microsoft 1 2 arising out of Microsoft's alleged practice of"unilateral negative option billing.' '173 The named plaintiffs were
residents of different states and purported to represent a
nationwide class of 1.5 million Microsoft Network ("MSN")
members. Microsoft moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue by reason of a forum selection
clause, which was in every MSN membership agreement and
thus purported to bind all the named plaintiffs and members of
the class. 174 The forum selection / choice of law clause provided
that the governing law was that of the State of Washington, and
that each member consented "to the exclusive jurisdiction and
venue of courts in King County, Washington in all disputes
167 Id. at 1264.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1265.
170 Id. at 1261.
171 Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999).
172 The defendants were two related corporate entities, Microsoft Network,
L.L.C. and Microsoft Corporation, but this Article will refer to them both simply as
"Microsoft," as did the court in the actual case. See id.
173 Under this practice, Microsoft without notice or permission from MSN
members, unilaterally increased membership fees attributing the change to changes
in the service plans. Id.
174 Id.
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arising out of or relating to your use of MSN or your MSN
membership.' ' 75
Finally, in Davidson and Associates v. Jung, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a clickwrap agreement
that prohibited reverse engineering. 176 In that case, the appellee,
Blizzard, created and sold software games, and provided a
gaming service available exclusively to purchasers of its games.177
Because it was concerned about piracy, Blizzard restricted access
to its service and required agreement to a clickwrap agreement
that prohibited reverse engineering. By reverse engineering, the
appellants were able to create an online gaming system as an
alternative to Blizzard's system. The appellants' system
contained operational differences from Blizzard's system and
enabled users to play pirated versions of appellee's games.178
The court stated that the appellants had expressly relinquished
their right to reverse engineer by agreeing to the terms of the
license agreement. 179
3. Browsewrap Agreements
Browsewrap agreements are terms that are posted on a web
site which do not require users to affirmatively manifest their
consent. In most cases, the web site or the browsewrap includes
a statement that the user's continued use of the web site or the
downloaded software manifests assent to those terms. Often,
the terms of browsewraps are prominently displayed but the
existence of the browsewrap itself is hidden on a page that few
users bother to visit-the "Legal" or "Terms" pages.'8 Unless
the user is expressly looking for such information, she or he is
unlikely to find it.
175 Id.
176 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir. 2005).
177 Id. at 633.
178 Id. at 636.
179 Id. at 639.
180 See General Electric, Terms, http://www.ge.com/terms.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2008); JSTOR, Terms and Conditions of Use of the JSTOR Archive,
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2008); Starwood Hotels,
Terms and Conditions for Use of This Site, http://www.starwoodhotels.com/
corporate/termsconditions.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
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Generally, courts will enforce browsewrap agreements only if
the user had adequate notice of their terms.' 8' In other words,
the terms must be both conspicuous and accessible. In Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp., for example, the Second
Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration clause in a browsewrap
agreement because users were able to download the free
software without indicating assent or acknowledging the license
agreement.182 Furthermore, in order to view the license terms,
the users were required to scroll down past the software
download button and then access the agreement by clicking on a
hyperlink. 183
Notice was also at issue in Polistar v. Gigmania, Ltd., where
the court refused to enforce the terms of an online license
1814agreement because the link to it was hard to read 4. Notably,
that court did not rule that the license agreement was
unenforceable, only that the web site did not give users adequate
notice of it. 85 In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the Second
Circuit found that Verio's continued use of Register.com's
WHOIS database constituted consent to Register.com's terms of
use, expressly rejecting Verio's argument that the terms were not
enforceable because the user had not clicked an "I agree"
icon.186
Finally, in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.,
Ticketmaster claimed that Tickets.com's use of automated
search software violated Ticketmaster's terms of use.187
Tickets.com used information obtained through its search
software to provide "deep links" from its web site to
Ticketmaster's event listings, thus enabling Tickets.com users to
bypass Ticketmaster's homepage. A prominent notice on
Ticketmaster's web site stated that by proceeding beyond the
home page, the user had accepted the terms of use. The court
181 Mark Lemley has argued that enforcement of browsewraps should be limited
to sophisticated commercial entities who are repeat players. See generally Lemley,
Terms of Use, supra note 7.
182 Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002).
183 Id. at 23.
184 Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
185 Id. at 981-82.
186 Register.com, Inc.v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2004).
187 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH(VBKx), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,2003).
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agreed, ruling that a contract could be formed simply by
proceeding to Ticketmaster's interior web pages "after
knowledge (or, in some cases, presumptive knowledge) of the
conditions accepted when doing so.'' 8
B. Balancing Individual Autonomy with Business Interests
Although courts analyze licenses as contracts, traditional
contract doctrine often fails to explain the wide range of judicial
decisions. In fact, courts often struggle against the constraints of
contract law, and the requirements of notice and assent, in order
to enforce the terms of shrinkwrap or browsewrap agreements
that pass the test of reasonableness but fail on the issue of
formation.
Clickwrap agreements, although often lumped together with
browsewrap and shrinkwrap agreements, are less troubling from
a doctrinal perspective in that they require a manifestation of
consent (albeit blanket consent) by the user. In reality, however,
this distinction is one without a difference. 89  While the
licensee's click manifests assent to the transaction and to the
contractual relationship, often the user does not read-and
therefore, cannot actually assent to-the contractual terms
themselves.1'9 The cases governing nonnegotiated software
188 But in a previous decision on the case, the court ruled that merely posting
terms and conditions on a web site does not create a contract unless the user had
actual knowledge of the contract terms. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Ticket.com, Inc., No.
CV99-7654-HLH(BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000),
affd mem., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 13598 (9th Cir. 2001).
189 In fact, Mark Lemley has suggested that judicial decisions enforcing clickwrap
and shrinkwrap agreements may have conditioned courts to disregard the concept
of assent when it comes to browsewraps. See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 7, at
469.
190 The Second Circuit in Register.com, recognized the difference between notice
as a prerequisite to performance and the dubious need for expressions of assent
when it stated:
There is a crucial difference between the circumstances of Specht, where
we declined to enforce Netscape's specified terms against a user of its
software because of inadequate evidence that the user had seen the terms
when downloading the software, and those of Ticketmaster, where the taker
of information from Ticketmaster's site knew full well the terms on which
the information was offered but was not offered an icon marked "I agree,"
on which to click. Under the circumstances of Ticketmaster, we see no
reason why the enforceability of the offeror's terms should depend on
whether the taker states (or clicks) "I agree. "
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licenses frame the issue as one of contract formation. But in
order to understand the wide range of judicial opinions, it is
necessary to move beyond a discussion of contract doctrine and
examine the business environment in which these licenses were
created. As the court in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology noted in discussing shrinkwrap licenses:
When these form licenses were first developed for software,
it was, in large part, to avoid the federal copyright law first sale
doctrine.... Because of the ease of copying software, software
producers were justifiably concerned that companies would
spring up that would purchase copies of various programs and
then lease those to consumers. Typically, the companies, like a
videotape rental store, would purchase a number of copies of
each program, and then make them available for over-night
rental to consumers. Consumers, instead of purchasing their
own copy of the program would simply rent a copy of the
program, and duplicate it. This copying by the individual
consumers would presumably infringe the copyright, but
usually it would be far too expensive for the copyright holder
to identify and sue each individual copier. Thus, software
producers wanted to sue the companies that were renting the
copies of the program to individual consumers, rather than the
individual consumers.191
As many commentators have argued, these types of agreements
(and form agreements in other industries) provide a societal
benefit by facilitating transactions. In other words, they should
be enforced not because they manifest the classic signs of
bargaining, but because they are good for society, and are
generally not harmful to the licensee. As Easterbrook noted in
ProCD:
Ours is not a case in which a consumer opens a package to find
an insert saying "you owe us an extra $10,000" and the seller
files suit to collect. Any buyer finding such a demand can
prevent formation of the contract by returning the package, as
can any consumer who concludes that the terms of the license
make the software worth less than the purchase price. Nothing
We recognize that contract offers on the Internet often require the
offeree to click on an "I agree" icon. And no doubt, in many
circumstances, such a statement of agreement by the offeree is essential to
the formation of a contract. But not in all circumstances.
Register corn, 356 F.3d at 403 (emphasis added).
191 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991).
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in the ,UCC requires a seller to maximize the buyer's net
gains.
But is Easterbrook actually saying that consent should be
foisted upon an unwitting consumer who is then forced to
disavow such consent? Is it fair to place an affirmative
obligation upon the buyer to "decline" this unreasonable
contract term?
A more palatable explanation of the rationale underlying
ProCD and other cases upholding contracts "formed" without
notice is that there is little harm in enforcing the contractual
term. While actual assent may be missing, the consumer's assent
can be presumed because the consumer would have agreed to the
term if he or she had actually read it or else the licensor would
not have permitted the transaction at all. In nearly all the cases
upholding the terms of a nonnegotiated software license, the
licensor was suing because the licensee was using the software or
product in a manner expressly prohibited by the licensor, not
because the licensor wished to enforce an affirmative obligation
term (such as payment of additional money). 93  The courts,
while using the language of contract law, were enforcing fair
business practices.194
The courts must use the language of contracts because the
contract is the vehicle by which the license is made, but it is the
transfer of (some) rights that affects the analysis of the contract.
If, for example, the shrinkwrap license is not enforceable as a
contract due to lack of assent, then the licensor has lost control
over how the software is used. If the licensee then decides to use
the data stored in the software to undermine the licensor's
business, the licensor is helpless to prevent such action.
192 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
193 See Jacques de Werra, Moving Beyond the Conflict Between Freedom of
Contract and Copyright Policies: In Search of a New Global Policy for On-Line
Information Licensing Transactions, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 239, 263 n.130 (2003)
(noting that "commercial use is basically not fair use").
194 See id. at 263. ("The court observed that the defendant in ProCD cannot be
considered as the best example of an oppressed private user on whom the content
owner would have imposed unduly restrictive contractual conditions, appearing
instead as a free-riding competitor. Viewed from a transatlantic perspective,
Zeidenberg's activities would typically have been prohibited by general unfair
competition laws or laws specifically protecting database producers so that the
thorny issues regarding both the validity of the contract and the preemption analysis
could have been totally avoided."). Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Although the licensor does not have an obligation to provide the
data in the first place, if the licensor does, the licensee may use it
in a manner that hurts the licensor's business unless the licensor
can protect itself with the only means available-a contract.
Without a legal right to stop the licensee from using the software
to the licensor's detriment, there is then no economic incentive
for the licensor to develop and distribute the data in the first
place.'95 The intangible nature of the product (that is, not the
disc itself but the information contained therein), makes the
need for contract enforcement more compelling. 96
If I decide to sell my car to you, I no longer have the right to
tell you what to do with it. If I lease my car to you, however, it
remains mine, and I should therefore have the ability to set
parameters on your use. If I own a store, your presence is
permitted unless I decide to kick you out. If you purchase an
item of clothing from my store, your ability to return it is subject
to my policy on exchanges and refunds. If, however, you use my
web site and accompanying services to solicit my unwitting
customers to your competing web site, thereby undermining my
business, I cannot stop you unless I have a contractual right to
do so. Unlike in the real world, I cannot kick you out of my
store or repossess the car. The only method of enforcement
available to me is afforded by contract.
Generally, the court decisions in this area recognize the
technology provider's dilemma and, in the interests of
facilitating business transactions,' 97  have enforced these
agreements-at least where there has been notice.' 98 Often,
195 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 Hous. L.
REV. 953 (2005); O'Rourke, supra note 1, at 496-99 (discussing why licensors may
feel the need to include particular provisions that track the Copyright Act).
196 See Madison, supra note 72, at 290 (discussing how the "former implicit and
limited governance defined by control of access to chattel and licensing of copyright
evaporates" with digital technology and how the software license tries to "replicate"
it).
197 For a discussion of form agreements generally, see Kessler, supra note 11;
Rakoff, supra note 12.
198 In ProCD, for example, the court addressed the realities of the way business is
conducted in the software industry:
Next consider the software industry itself. Only a minority of sales take
place over the counter, where there are boxes to peruse. A customer may
place an order by phone in response to a line item in a catalog or a review
in a magazine. Much software is ordered over the Internet by purchasers
who have never seen a box. Increasingly software arrives by wire. There is
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notice has been interpreted as an "opportunity to read," even
where such opportunity was, in practicality, fictitious. The
decisions reveal that the absence of an opportunity to read prior
to the transaction does not necessarily render an agreement
invalid.' 99  A particular provision, however, should not be
no box; there is only a stream of electrons, a collection of information that
includes data, an application program, instructions, many limitations
("MegaPixel 3.14159 cannot be used with Byte-Pusher 2.718"), and the
terms of sale. The user purchases a serial number, which activates the
software's features. On Zeidenberg's arguments, these unboxed sales are
unfettered by terms-so the seller has made a broad warranty and must
pay consequential damages for any shortfalls in performance, two"promises" that if taken seriously would drive prices through the ceiling or
return transactions to the horse-and-buggy age.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996).
199 The court in ProCD, for example, noted that in certain industries, transactions
in which the exchange of money precedes detailed terms is common and requiring
consumers to actually sign contractual terms would result in higher prices and
greater inconvenience:
Consider the purchase of insurance. The buyer goes to an agent, who
explains the essentials (amount of coverage, number of years) and remits
the premium to the home office, which sends back a policy. On the district
judge's understanding, the terms of the policy are irrelevant because the
insured paid before receiving them. Yet the device of payment, often with
a "binder" (so that the insurance takes effect immediately even though the
home office reserves the right to withdraw coverage later), in advance of
the policy, serves buyers' interests by accelerating effectiveness and
reducing transactions costs. Or consider the purchase of an airline ticket.
The traveler calls the carrier or an agent, is quoted a price, reserves a seat,
pays, and gets a ticket, in that order. The ticket contains elaborate terms,
which the traveler can reject by canceling the reservation. To use the ticket
is to accept the terms, even terms that in retrospect are
disadvantageous. ... Just so with a ticket to a concert. The back of the
ticket states that the patron promises not to record the concert; to attend is
to agree. A theater that detects a violation will confiscate the tape and
escort the violator to the exit. One could arrange things so that every
concertgoer signs this promise before forking over the money, but that
cumbersome way of doing things not only would lengthen queues and raise
prices but also would scotch the sale of tickets by phone or electronic data
service.
Consumer goods work the same way. Someone who wants to buy a
radio set visits a store, pays, and walks out with a box. Inside the box is a
leaflet containing some terms, the most important of which usually is the
warranty, read for the first time in the comfort of home. By Zeidenberg's
lights, the warranty in the box is irrelevant; every consumer gets the
standard warranty implied by the UCC in the event the contract is silent;
yet so far as we are aware no state disregards warranties furnished with
consumer products. Drugs come with a list of ingredients on the outside
and an elaborate package insert on the inside. The package insert
describes drug interactions, contraindications, and other vital
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enforced until the licensee has received actual notice of the
provision. In other words, the licensee's obligation to perform in
accordance with the terms of use arises when the licensee
becomes aware of such terms, not when the transaction is
entered into.
200In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the defendant Verio sold
a variety of web site design, development, and operation services
which competed with the plaintiff Register.com's web site
development business. Verio obtained daily updates of
information from Register.com's computers relating to newly
registered domain names via an automated software program.
Verio's practice of e-mail solicitations to those registered names
was inconsistent with the terms of the restrictive legend
Register.com attached to its responses to queries by Verio's.
Some of the recipients of Verio's solicitations believed they were
coming from Register.com (or an affiliate), and were sent in
violation of the registrant's election not to receive solicitations
201from Register.com. When Register.com sent Verio a cease
and desist letter, it refused. Verio claimed that it "never became
contractually bound to the conditions imposed by Register's
restrictive legend because, in the case of each query Verio made,
the legend did not appear until after Verio had submitted the
query and received the WHOIS data., 20 2 Verio contended that
it did not receive legally enforceable notice of the conditions
Register intended to impose, and therefore should not be
deemed to have taken WHOIS data from Register's systems
information-but, if Zeidenberg is right, the purchaser need not read the
package insert, because it is not part of the contract.
Id. at 1451. The court in Polistar v. Gigmania, Ltd. cited to the ProCD court's
rationale, concluding:
While the court agrees with Gigmania that the user is not immediately
confronted with the notice of the license agreement, this does not dispose
of Pollstar's breach of contract claim. Taking into consideration the
examples provided by the Seventh Circuit-showing that people
sometimes enter into a contract by using a service without first seeing the
terms-the browser wrap license agreement may be arguably valid and
enforceable.
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000); see also Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
200 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
201 Id. at 396-97.
202 Id. at 401.
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203subject to Register's conditions. The court rejected Verio's
argument:
Verio's argument might well be persuasive if its queries
addressed to Register's computers had been sporadic and
infrequent. If Verio had submitted only one query, or even if
it had submitted only a few sporadic queries, that would give
considerable force to its contention that it obtained the
WHOIS data without being conscious that Register intended
to impose conditions, and without being deemed to have
accepted Register's conditions. But Verio was daily submitting
numerous queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice
of the terms Register exacted. Furthermore, Verio admits that
it knew perfectlv well what terms Register demanded. Verio's
argument fails.
In other words, even if Verio was not aware of Register.com's
terms of use at the time it entered into the transaction, it
subsequently became aware of the terms. While Verio did not
have an opportunity to read the terms prior to each transaction,
because it engaged in multiple transactions, it had actual notice
of such terms at the time Register.com issued its cease and desist
demand. If, however, Register.com had sued Verio for breach of
contract after the first transaction (and assuming that it had not
sent Verio a cease and desist letter), the results would be
otherwise. As the court noted:
The situation might be compared to one in which plaintiff P
maintains a roadside fruit stand displaying bins of apples. A
visitor, defendant D, takes an apple and bites into it. As D
turns to leave, D sees a sign, visible only as one turns to exit,
which says "Apples-50 cents apiece." D does not pay for the
apple. D believes he has no obligation to pay because he had
no notice when he bit into the apple that 50 cents was expected
in return. D's view is that he never agreed to pay for the apple.
Thereafter, each day, several times a day, D revisits the stand,
takes an apple, and eats it. D never leaves money.
P sues D in contract for the price of the apples taken. D
defends on the ground that on no occasion did he see P's price
notice until after he had bitten into the apples. D may well
prevail as to the first apple taken. D had no reason to
understand upon taking it that P was demanding the payment.
In our view, however, D cannot continue on a daily basis to
take apples for free, knowing full well that P is offering them
only in exchange for 50 cents in compensation, merely because
203 Id.
204 Id.
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the sign demanding payment is so placed that on each occasion
D does not see it until he has bitten into the apple. 20 5
Verio's claim of "lack of notice" was disingenuous, not because
it had such notice at the time the transaction was entered into,
but because it subsequently had notice and chose not to comply
with such terms.
Similarly, in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, the defendant was being
sued for using the ProCD data in a manner that the defendant
knew was contrary to the licensor's business model given the
pricing differential of the commercial and noncommercial
versions of the product. As the owner of the software code, the
licensor has the right to establish the way in which it may be
used. Zeidenberg had no independent right to use that software,
and was only permitted to do so pursuant to a license granted by
ProCD. The issue of whether Zeidenberg actually assented to
the scope of license terms was irrelevant; what was relevant was
that he knew what they were when he engaged in the prohibited
behavior. While Zeidenberg was not obligated to act in
accordance with such terms until he became aware of them, once
he became aware of the terms of use he was bound by them.
The same is not true if the provisions impose an affirmative
obligation or deprive the licensee of a legal right. ProCD, as
licensor, could not force Zeidenberg to perform affirmative acts
(such as start a business promoting ProCD's products) via a
shrinkwrap license; it could, however, determine the scope of the
license granted to Zeidenberg. Zeidenberg, in purchasing the
software, was buying only a limited right to use the software
without being sued by the actual owner-ProCD-and that
permission was granted contingent upon the terms of use
contained in the license. The grant of that permission, however,
could not diminish Zeidenberg's preexisting legal rights.
Returning to the car leasing analogy, if I let you lease my car,
I can set the parameters of your use. If you do not abide by my
wishes, I can take away your right to use my car. If you are not
aware of my conditions-for example, that I do not want you to
smoke in my car-you can smoke until I find out about it and
tell you to stop. You cannot continue to smoke in my car
knowing that I don't want you to because it is, after all, my car.
Nor can I make you pay for cleaning the car to rid it of the odor
205 Id.
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of smoke unless you knew beforehand that smoking was
prohibited.
C. Sample License Analysis
This Article argues that those terms that are part of a
nonnegotiated license agreement include those to which the
licensee has actually assented, and those pertaining to the scope
of license or terms of use if they do not impose affirmative
obligations or deprive the licensee of legal rights. What happens
then where a nonnegotiated license agreement contains
affirmative obligation terms unrelated to the scope of the license
or terms that deprive the licensee of a legal right?
In this section, I apply my proposed approach to a sample
shrinkwrap license agreement containing many of the provisions
206found to be standard in such agreements .
This provision imposes an affirmative obligation upon the
licensee and would not be enforceable because there is no actual
assent.
206 For a discussion of terms commonly found in shrinkwrap agreements, see
Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 5, at 1242-48 (examining the purpose
underlying proprietary rights, limitation on warranties, and limitation on user rights
provisions).
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This sentence clarifies the nature of the transaction as being a
license, and not a sale or transfer of intellectual property rights to
the software code. Because it does not impose affirmative
obligations upon the licensee or deprive the licensee of legal
rights, it should be enforceable.
It is unclear what "make available" means. If it means that the
licensee is prohibited from permitting third parties to infringe
upon the trade secret, copyright, or patent rights of the licensor, it
merely informs the licensee of its existing legal obligations. If it
means that the licensee cannot permit third parties to use the
software, that restriction is covered in the section on Scope of
License. If the intent of this provision is to impose an obligation
on the licensee to hide the software from third parties, it is not
enforceable. The prohibition against disclosure of trade secrets
seems particularly nonsensical. The typical consumer licensee is
not privy to confidential information and the software is being
207sold to the public at large. Because this sentence imposes a
blanket obligation of nondisclosure upon the licensee, it should
not be enforceable.
207 See Hemnes, supra note 61, at 577-81 (explaining that lawyers for software
developers used to think that the only protection for their client's programs was
under trade secret law, but in order to do so, the right of possession had to be
separate from the right of alienation); Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 5, at
1281-82 (noting that shrinkwrap licenses permit software vendors "to obtain both
patent and trade secret protection concurrently in different aspects of the same
program, as well as copyright protection in the whole program" with the result
being that "vendors can obtain the powerful rights of patent law without having to'pay the price' of a shorter term and the loss of trade secret protection").
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This provision provides the terms of use or the conditions
under which the licensor licenses its software. The licensee should
not have the right to use the software in a manner prohibited by
the licensor. Furthermore, the licensee does not have the legal
right to use the software at all without the licensor's permission,
which the licensor is granting only with these restrictions.
Generally, prohibitions against modifying and reverse engineering
deprive the licensee of a right expressly granted under the
Copyright Act; however this particular reference expressly permits
such activities "to the extent permitted by law." Consequently, this
208provision would be enforceable.
208 In Davidson and Associates v. Jung, the appellants were able to create an
alternative online gaming system by reverse engineering. While the court in that
case upheld the prohibition against reverse engineering contained in the contract,
under the approach proposed in this Article, such a prohibition would require
actual assent. The appellants in Davidson and Associates, however, would still be
prohibited from the infringing activity under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act,
which prohibits a person from circumventing a technological measure that controls
copyright-protected works. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639-42 (8th
Cir. 2005); see also supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Davidson and Associates).
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This provision sets forth terms of use, and termination of the
right to use, the software. As it does not impose an affirmative
obligation or deprive the licensee of a legal right, it should be
enforceable.
This provision requires actual assent.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
Under the U.C.C., the licensee has the right to certain implied
warranties;209 however, the U.C.C. recognizes and permits
warranty disclaimers provided that they are conspicuous, mention
merchantability, and are in writing.20 The enforceability of this
disclaimer would depend upon how the relevant state implements
and interprets the U.C.C. provisions governing warranties and
warranty disclaimers. The U.C.C. does not expressly require the
consumer's assent to warranty disclaimers, although the
requirements of conspicuousness indicate that the drafters viewed
such disclaimers as being contractual in nature. In addition, the
provisions must comply with the federal law governing written
warranties, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. If these
211provisions do comply, then they should be enforceable.
209 Section 2-314 states that "[a] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind." Section 2-312(3) states that "a seller that is a merchant regularly dealing
in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful
claim of any third person by way of infringement."
210 Under section 2-316(2):
[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part
of it in a consumer contract the language must be in a record, be
conspicuous, and state "the seller undertakes no responsibility for the
quality of goods except as otherwise provided in this contract," and in any
other contract the language must mention merchantability and in case of a
record must be conspicuous . . . . [T]o exclude or modify the implied
warranty of fitness, the exclusion must be in a record amd be conspicuous.
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2003).
211 The issue of whether the provisions comply with the U.C.C. requirements may
nevertheless pose some difficulties. For example, in Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., the
Delaware Superior Court found that a warranty disclaimer in a rolling contract was
conspicuous even though it was located within the product packaging. Rinaldi v.
Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 563, at *19 (Del.
Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) (mem.). For a critique of that case, see Friedman, supra
note 11, at 692 ("The Rinaldi court's reasoning on conspicuousness was far from
unassailable and demonstrates some of the weaknesses of using conspicuousness to
assess the timing of disclaimers.") The Rinaldi court relied too literally on ProCD,
thus illustrating the danger of claiming actual assent where there is in fact none. If
the court in ProCD had expressly stated that it was presuming assent to the scope of
license terms-and no other-the Rinaldi court would have had no precedent for
claiming that there was actual assent to all packaged terms. Implied warranty
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Limitations of liability are also permitted under the U. C. C.
provided that they do not fail of their "essential purpose.,212
Again, their enforceability depends on how a particular
jurisdiction has interpreted the U.C.C. provision governing
limitations of liability.
This provision uses language that appears to impose an
213affirmative obligation upon the licensee. Ordinarily, the
licensee would be liable for any infringement caused by her
misuse; however, she would not be obligated to indemnify the
licensor against all claims filed against the licensor. Because the
provision imposes an affirmative obligation upon the licensee, it
would not be part of the agreement between the parties without
actual assent. As a practical matter, a third party suing the
licensor on the basis of misuse by licensee would have to prove the
licensor's involvement, whether by passive knowledge or active
assistance.
disclaimers are clearly not conspicuous if they are contained within the package and
unavailable for inspection until after purchase.
212 U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2003). Section 2-719(1)(a) provides:
[T]he agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution
for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of
damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and
replacement of non-conforming goods or parts ....
213 The provision is poorly drafted; although the language can be interpreted as
"any misuse" by any person, the more reasonable interpretation of this provision
would require the misuse to have been conducted by the licensee. To the extent
that the licensor is purporting to make the licensee responsible for misuse by third
parties, it imposes an affirmative obligation that is not expressly agreed to and there
is unlikely to be a default state law that imposes such an obligation absent
extenuating circumstances.
2007]
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This provision restricts the licensee's ability to bring a lawsuit.
This provision is enforceable if the licensee actually assented to it.
If it did not, then assent cannot be presumed. The court would
then refer to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which permits
informal dispute resolution procedures provided they conform to
214certain requirements.
CONCLUSION
Licensors may fear that the manipulability of software makes
it susceptible to infringers who may be difficult to locate and
215control. I do not wish to resolve in this Article whether a
licensor's fears of infringement are legitimate; my Article
216assumes that they are. Regardless of whether this fear is well
217founded, owners of intellectual property should be permitted
214 Magnoson-Moss Warranty Act, 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.1-703.5 (2008).
215 See Madison, supra note 72, at 313-14 ("In a world of mass-marketed software
... developers needed a mechanism to protect both copyright interests and their
confidential information while simultaneously sharing these products with the world
at large."). Those who claim that a producer of software is adequately protected by
patent law ignore that many software producers do not file patents. John R.
Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1579 (2007).
216 As Mark Lemley explains, while today it is generally accepted that copyright
law protects computer software, the issue remained unresolved through the late
1970s until the enactment of the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act. The same
uncertainty reigned over the patentability of computer software. See Lemley,
Intellectual Property, supra note 5, at 1242-43; see also O'Rourke, supra note 1, at
488-90 (noting the ways in which the soft copy world differs from the hard copy
world which may compel licensing of software). Providers of electronic databases,
however, may not be protected under copyright law and may need the protection
offered by a license. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Jennett M. Hill, Note, The State of Copyright Protection for
Electronic Databases Beyond ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Are Shrinkwrap Licenses a
Viable Alternative for Database Protection?, 31 IND. L. REV. 143 (1998).
217 See Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C.
L. REV. 433, 446-52 (2003), for a discussion of evolution of the clickwrap agreement
as a mechanism for protecting the commercial value of computer programs and
databases.
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to establish the parameters of any license grant. The freedom to
do so, however, is subject to the preexisting rights of the
licensee. The courts have used the language of contract law to
uphold nonnegotiated software licenses even where actual assent
was absent. This Article argues that rather than upholding such
agreements by claiming that the licensee actually assented to the
terms, the courts should expressly acknowledge the use of
presumed assent. Presumed assent should only be applied to the
scope of the license terms or the terms of use. A finding of
presumed or actual assent is necessary to contract formation;
however, a contract might still be found unenforceable if
traditional contract defenses, such as unconscionability, are
applicable. Furthermore, the obligation to perform in
accordance with the terms of use or the scope of license should
be subject to notice. Thus, the condition to the effectiveness of
those provisions where there is only presumed, not actual, assent
should depend upon an opportunity to read the terms.
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